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I.  Introduction 
 
 An enduring reality demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 is that non-state actors are capable of projecting extreme violence across 
the globe.  The September 11 attackers were a variety of individuals who were 
trained and recruited across multiple states, who were instructed and funded by a 
loose but sophisticated al Qaeda network, and who then surreptitiously acquired 
the means to unleash a vicious attack that within a matter of hours killed more 
than three thousand people, mostly civilians.1  
 
 This ability of non-state actors to project force across the globe is 
particularly troubling in the context of their potential use of weapons of mass 
destruction (“WMD”).  Although governments have possessed WMD for many 
decades, such weapons have rarely been used, largely because of the 
understanding by states that the use of WMD against another state would almost 
certainly lead to general, worldwide condemnation and possibly a response in 
kind.  Such notions of inter-state deterrence and reciprocity, however, are far less 
apparent with respect to relations between a state and a non-state actor engaged 
in terrorist behavior, especially if the non-state actor is not seeking broad 
sympathy for its cause.  A terrorist organization may well believe that 
responsibility for a WMD attack could be concealed from the attacked state, or 
believe that the attacked state could not effectively respond against an 
amorphous non-state network.  Thus, were such a network able to obtain WMD--
whether in the form of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons--there may be 
little incentive not to use them. 
 
___________________________________ 
 
* My thanks to the Fletcher School of Tufts University for the opportunity to 
present an earlier version of this paper, and to José Arvelo-Vélez for both 
thoughtful insights and invaluable research assistance. 
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 Acquisition of WMD by non-state actors may be difficult, but is not 
impossible.  Large stocks of Russian plutonium from dismantled weapons are 
vulnerable to theft and sale on the black market.2  Infectious organisms suitable 
for bioterrorist use are available for commercial sale; some twenty-five such 
organisms can even be obtained from natural sources, such as infected animals 
or, in the case of anthrax, the soil.3  The possibility of an attack by terrorists using 
chemical weapons was vividly demonstrated in March 1995 in Tokyo, Japan, 
when a religious cult released a form of sarin nerve gas in Tokyo’s subway 
system during morning rush hour, killing twelve and injuring more than five 
thousand people.4  Once WMD are acquired, transporting them across the globe 
is also difficult, but not impossible.  The United States has 14,000 small airports 
and 95,000 miles of unprotected coastline; of the some 16 million cargo 
containers that reach U.S. shores each year, only five percent are inspected.5  
The idea that an organization such as al Qaeda may obtain a WMD, smuggle it 
into the United States on board a container ship and then release or detonate it 
in a major U.S. city, strikes many analysts as not so much a question of “if” as it 
is a question of “when.”6
 
 The realities of the post-September 11 period led the Bush Administration 
in 2002 to articulate, in very strong and public terms, a doctrine of “preemptive 
self-defense.”  Among other things, the doctrine asserted an evolved right under 
international law for the United States to use military force “preemptively” against 
the threat posed by “rogue states” or terrorists who possess WMD.7  According to 
the Bush Administration: 
 
 For centuries, international law recognized that nations need 
not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend 
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of 
attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the 
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat--
most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack. 
 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today’s adversaries.  Rogue states and terrorists 
do not seek to attack us using conventional means.  They know 
such attacks would fail.  Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, 
potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction--weapons that 
can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without 
warning. 
 
. . . . 
 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive 
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.  The 
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greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of 
the enemy’s attack.  To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.8
 
 Although the Bush Administration articulated the doctrine, acceptance of 
the doctrine within the U.S. government appears widespread.  In the joint 
resolution enacted by Congress to authorize the use of force against Iraq in 
2002-2003, Congress found: 
 
Iraq’s demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of 
mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either 
employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the 
United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international 
terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that 
would result to the United States and its citizens from such an 
attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend 
itself.”9  
 
Asked about this issue during the 2004 presidential campaign, the nominee for 
the Democratic Party endorsed the doctrine.10
 
 Compliance with international law on the use of armed force presents 
extraordinary problems, for such law implicates core national security interests of 
states (the same phenomenon may be seen in disputes over the war power in 
U.S. constitutional law).  Nevertheless, policy-makers must pay attention to 
whether a particular act of “preemptive self-defense” would likely be regarded as 
violating international law, because there may be significant political, economic, 
and military repercussions, as discussed in Part II.11  To date, however, no 
authoritative decision-maker within the international community has taken a 
position on whether preemptive self-defense is permissible under international 
law, or whether it is permissible but only under certain conditions.  The judicial 
wing of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), has not 
passed upon a case or issued an advisory opinion on preemptive self-defense.  
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua12 case 
(“Nicaragua case”), the ICJ advanced important interpretations regarding the 
status of law on the use of force, but the ICJ went out of its way to state 
expressly that it took no view on “the lawfulness of a response to the imminent 
threat of an armed attack.”13  The U.N. Security Council, charged with 
maintaining peace and security, has issued no resolution expressly condemning 
or approving of preemptive self-defense, although it has issued important 
decisions that relate to the issue. 
 
 Consequently, states and scholars are left arguing its legality based 
principally on their interpretation of the meaning of the U.N. Charter and on state 
 T-3
practice since the Charter’s enactment in 1945.  As discussed in Part III, 
international lawyers (whether government attorneys, other practitioners or 
academics) have taken very different views regarding the legality of preemptive 
self-defense, and their views might be seen as falling into four basic schools of 
thought: the strict constructionist school, the imminent threat school, the 
qualitative threat school and the “charter is dead” school.14  Part IV suggests that 
this fracturing of views is attributable at least in part to the unwillingness of most 
international lawyers to articulate and defend the methodology that they are 
using in reaching their views, which would require confronting certain 
methodological problems in assessing state practice since the enactment of the 
U.N. Charter in 1945.15  The lawyer’s craft is something between an art and a 
science; although interpretation of prior precedent cannot be done with precision, 
it must be done in accordance with recognizable and rational standards in order 
to be persuasive. 
 
 Until lawyers more fully grapple with these issues of methodology, it is 
unlikely that greater convergence within the community of international lawyers 
will emerge.  Through greater convergence, the normative standards set by 
international law may become clearer and more helpful for states in ordering their 
relations, thus promoting greater stability for inter-state relations.  Moreover, if at 
some point there is an effort to amend the Charter or to supplement the Charter 
with more detailed criteria for uses of force, greater convergence of views among 
international lawyers will be essential. 
 
 Before turning to the relevance of international law to this particular topic, 
a word on terminology is in order.  For purposes of this article, the term “self-
defense” refers to the use of armed coercion by a state against another state in 
response to a prior use of armed coercion by the other state or by a non-state 
actor operating from that other state.  “Anticipatory self-defense” refers to the use 
of armed coercion by a state to halt an imminent act of armed coercion by 
another state (or non-state actor operating from that other state).  Thus, 
anticipatory self-defense contemplates a situation where a state has not yet been 
the victim of such a coercive act, but perceives that such an act is about to occur 
in the immediate future (e.g., a foreign army is massing itself along the border in 
apparent preparation for invasion), and thus that potential victim state undertakes 
its own act of armed coercion to stave off the other’s act.  Such anticipatory self-
defense is, of course, “preemptive” in nature, but for purposes of this article, the 
term “preemptive” is not used to describe this form of self-defense.  Instead, 
“preemptive self defense” is used to refer to the use of armed coercion by a state 
to prevent another state (or non-state actor) from pursuing a particular course of 
action which is not yet directly threatening, but which, if permitted to continue, 
could result at some future point in an act of armed coercion against the first 
state.  Such preemptive self-defense is, of course, “anticipatory” and might even 
be called “preventive” self-defense, but for purposes of this article, such 
terminology is not used to describe this form of self-defense. 
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II. Why the Law Matters 
 
 Law has many different functions. In the context of international law 
relating to the use of military force, law is best seen as a means of predicting 
global reactions to a proposed use of such force.  In this context, when a lawyer 
says that a proposed course of action would be unlawful, the lawyer is really 
saying that in the past international society has decided that such an action is 
wrongful and, in similar circumstances, will likely do so again.  Lawyers are 
trained to be good at making such predictions; they are fixated on the 
instruments of the past, be they treaties or statutes, which crystallize societal 
expectations, principles and beliefs into rules.  Lawyers are also fixated on 
understanding and interpreting prior factual incidents in which those societal 
beliefs were tested and perhaps refined through courts and other decision-
makers.  Where there are gaps in our understanding of societal expectations, 
lawyers are clever at analytically filling those gaps and at seeking to extrapolate 
from what we know about societal beliefs to make situations of uncertainty more 
certain.  And perhaps most important, lawyers appreciate that society deeply 
adheres to a normative system that will endure, and this in turn means that rules 
must operate over the long-term.  They cannot be set aside when convenient to 
serve short-term interests, and they must be perceived as fair, legitimate, just 
and consistent with notions of equality, rather than arbitrary or irrational. 
 
 A government policy-maker considering an act of preemptive self-defense 
will want to know if the act would be regarded as lawful because it helps predict 
attitudes within the policy-maker’s own government, whether those attitudes 
emerge in executive, legislative or judicial settings.  To the extent that the act is 
regarded as a violation of international law, the policy-maker is being alerted that 
the act would likely be viewed as wrongful.  Knowing whether the act would be 
regarded as lawful will assist the policy-maker in predicting whether the general 
public would view the course of action as wrongful and whether foreign 
governments and their peoples, and possibly an international court, would react 
adversely to the course of action.16  Even in the United States, a country where 
public attitudes toward international law vary considerably, government officials 
and legislators seek to convince the public why a particular course of action is 
consistent with international law.17
 
  Societal attitudes are important because if resistance is strong, the policy-
maker may not be able to undertake a particular course of action (e.g., in the 
United States or the United Kingdom, an adverse legislative vote may make an 
executive resort to military force untenable).  Of course, even in the face of 
strong resistance, the policy-maker might undertake the act if, for political or 
national security reasons, the policy-maker feels there is no choice.  But the 
policy-maker may be interested in knowing whether, by conducting the action in a 
particular way, the policy-maker is more or less likely to run afoul of the law, for 
such knowledge may help the policy maker achieve the objectives with the 
lowest level of societal approbation.  That approbation may have serious 
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consequences for the policy-maker, particularly over the long-term, in the form of 
eroding political support domestically and abroad for a government’s policies, 
inability to secure military assistance from foreign partners in the form of troops, 
bases, transport and materials, and the inability to share with those partners or 
international organizations the economic costs of both the military action and any 
ensuing acts of peacekeeping or reconstruction. 
 
 To date, however, lawyers have had difficulty in reaching a consensus on 
whether preemptive self-defense is lawful and, if so, whether certain criteria or 
conditions must be met.  Because no authoritative decision-maker has spoken 
directly to the issue, international lawyers are left arguing the legality of 
preemptive self-defense based principally on their interpretation of the meaning 
of the U.N. Charter as enacted in 1945 and on state practice since that time.  In 
doing so, lawyers have taken very different views regarding the legality of 
preemptive self-defense and, as discussed in the next section, those views might 
be seen as falling into four basic schools of thought.18  
 
III. Four Schools of Thought 
 
 Contemporary attitudes of government lawyers or academics on the issue 
of preemptive self-defense tend to fall into four different schools of thought.  
Describing these views as “schools” may be overly formal; such lawyers probably 
do not see themselves as part of a “school” in the sense of having an elaborate 
framework upon which their views are constructed.  Moreover, international 
lawyers within a single school may differ in certain respects, and the views of 
some international lawyers may be seen as straddling these schools of thought 
or as moving from one school to another over time.19  Nevertheless, the different 
schools identified here rest upon broad conceptions as to the status of 
international law on this topic, and probing at those different conceptions may 
help in promoting convergence among them. 
 
A. The Strict-Constructionist School
 
 The strict constructionist school begins with the proposition that Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter contains a broad prohibition on the use of force.20  The 
term “use of force” in Article 2(4)--as opposed to the term “war,” as used in the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 192821--reflected a desire to prohibit transnational armed 
conflicts generally, not just conflicts arising from a formal state of war.  As such, 
this school emphasizes that Article 2(4) is best viewed as outlawing any 
transboundary use of military force, including force justified by reference to the 
various doctrines developed in the pre-Charter era of forcible self-help, reprisal, 
protection of nationals and humanitarian intervention.22  To the extent that there 
is a need to refer to the negotiating history of the U.N. Charter, that history 
indicates that Article 2(4) was intended to be a comprehensive prohibition on the 
use of force by one state against the other.23
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 The strict constructionist school acknowledges that the U.N. Charter 
provides two express exceptions to this broad prohibition.  First, the Security 
Council may authorize a use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter,24 which 
would require an affirmative vote of nine of its fifteen Members and the 
concurrence or abstention of its five permanent Members (China, France, 
Russia, United Kingdom and United States).  Some strict constructionists might 
challenge the authority of the Security Council to authorize Member States, 
especially if operating under national military command, to engage in preemptive 
self-defense, but the debate over preemptive self-defense to date has not related 
to potential Security Council authorization. 
 
 Second, states may use force in self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the 
Charter.  Article 51 states that the Charter does not impair the “inherent right” of 
self-defense “if an armed attack occurs” against a U.N. Member.25  In considering 
the legality of preemptive self-defense, the strict constructionist school hews 
closely to the language of Article 51.  Because Article 51 only contemplates an 
act of self-defense “if an armed attack occurs,” the strict constructionist maintains 
that neither anticipatory self-defense nor preemptive self-defense can be lawful 
because such forms of self-defense envisage action prior to an armed attack 
actually occurring.26  Thus, Ian Brownlie, writing in 1963, found that “the view that 
Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action is correct and . . . arguments to the 
contrary are either unconvincing or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence.”27  
For Philip Jessup, “[u]nder the Charter, alarming military preparations by a 
neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but would not 
justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself threatened.”28  
For Louis Henkin, allowing anticipatory action “would replace a clear standard 
with a vague, self-serving one, and open a loophole large enough to empty the 
rule.”29  Likewise, Yoram Dinstein, writing more recently, finds that  
 
[w]hen a country feels menaced by the threat of an armed attack, 
all that it is free to do--in keeping with the Charter--is make the 
necessary military preparations for repulsing the hostile action 
should it materialize, as well as bring the matter forthwith to the 
attention of the Security Council.30
 
  Moreover, the strict constructionist would note that in using the language 
“armed attack” rather than “use of force,” Article 51 is limiting the use of self-
defense to those situations where the victim state is exposed to a large-scale use 
of force, such as an invasion or a bombardment or other “most grave forms of the 
use of force.”31  This form of limitation does not speak directly to the issue of 
preemptive self-defense, but the uncertainty as to whether a future threat would 
actually rise to a level of being an “armed attack” may also suggest that 
preemptive self-defense was disfavored under Article 51.32
 
 Adherents to this school typically accept that state practice subsequent to 
the enactment of the U.N. Charter is relevant,33 although they (and many 
 T-7
international lawyers) are often not clear whether such practice is relevant for the 
purpose of: (1) interpreting the meaning of the Charter, since conduct by the 
parties to the Charter demonstrate the parties interpretation of its meaning; or (2) 
establishing a new norm of customary international law that supersedes the 
obligation of the Charter.  In any event, the strict constructionist’s review of that 
practice finds that invocations of a right of anticipatory self-defense (let alone a 
right of preemptive self-defense) are rare and are resisted by other states.  Thus, 
Louis Henkin, writing in 1979, asserted that “neither the failure of the Security 
Council, nor the Cold War, nor the birth of many new nations, nor the 
development of terrible weapons, suggests that the Charter should now be read 
to authorize unilateral force even if an armed attack has not occurred.”34  
Christine Gray, writing in 2000, concluded that  
 
States prefer to argue for an extended interpretation of armed 
attack and to avoid the fundamental doctrinal debate.  The clear 
trend in state practice is to try to bring the action within Article 51 
and to claim the existence of an armed attack rather than to 
expressly argue for a wider right under customary international 
law.35  
 
When pressed, some strict constructionists accept that anticipatory or preemptive 
action, while illegal, in some circumstances “may be justified on moral and 
political grounds and the community will eventually condone [it] or mete out 
lenient condemnation.”36
 
B. The Imminent Threat School
 
 Adherents to the “imminent threat” school accept that the language of 
Article 51 speaks of self-defense in response to an armed attack, but they 
employ three lines of argument to advance a norm favoring a right of anticipatory 
self-defense, but not preemptive self-defense.37  
 
First, they note that Article 51 speaks of the Charter not impairing an 
“inherent right” of self-defense, meaning that Article 51 does not create a right of 
self-defense but instead preserves a right that pre-existed the Charter.38  As 
such, adherents to this school note that the customary international law of self-
defense prior to 1945 recognized the ability of a state to defend against not just 
an existing attack, but also against an imminent threat of attack.39  The principal 
precedent relied upon is the Caroline incident, an 1836 clash between the United 
States and the United Kingdom in which U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
stated that self-defense is confined to “cases in which the ‘necessity of that self-
defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.”40  
 
 For adherents to the imminent threat school, this inherent right to defend 
against an imminent threat was preserved in Article 51.41  The language “if an 
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armed attack occurs” does not impose a condition on the exercise of this inherent 
right; it is simply indicating the general type of right that is being preserved.42  
Indeed, this school notes, the French text of the U.N. Charter (which is equally 
authoritative with the English text), preserved an inherent right of self-defense 
“dans un cas où un Membre des Nations Unies est l’object d’une agression 
armée” (“in a situation where a Member of the United Nations is the object of an 
armed attack”), a formulation that reads much less restrictively than its English 
counterpart.43  Although the strict constructionist sees such an interpretation as 
writing the “armed attack” language out of Article 51, the imminent threat theorist 
finds absurdity in believing that the drafters bent over backwards in Article 51 so 
as not to impair an “inherent right” only to then significantly restrict that right.44
 
 A second line of argument employed by this school is to expand the 
meaning of the term “armed attack.”  Although a narrow interpretation of armed 
attack might envisage only a use of force that has been consummated, a broader 
interpretation would view an “armed attack” as including an attack that is 
imminent and unavoidable even if not yet consummated.  Thus, when a state 
begins massing an army in an attack configuration along the border of another 
state, the first state has commenced the initial step of a multi-step armed attack, 
and the second state may respond in self-defense.  Here, too, the argument is 
concerned with the temporal nature of the threat; it must be closely associated in 
time and space with the expected unleashing of force. Although Louis Henkin is 
typically associated with the strict constructionist school, he accepts that if: 
 
there were clear evidence of an attack so imminent that there was 
no time for political action to prevent it, the only meaningful defense 
for the potential victim might indeed be the preemptive attack and--
it may be argued--the scheme of Article 2(4) together with Article 51 
was not intended to bar such attack. But this argument would claim 
a small and special exception for the special case of the surprise 
nuclear attack . . . .45
 
 Third, this school focuses on state practice since 1945, which purportedly 
demonstrates an acceptance of self-defense by states when an attack is 
imminent and unavoidable.  In this regard, repeated references are made to 
certain key incidents, such as: the 1962 “quarantine” of Cuba by the United 
States; the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the 1981 Israeli attack against an Iraqi nuclear 
facility; and the 1986 U.S. bombing raids against Libya.46  For each incident, 
according to this school, a state may be seen undertaking an action purportedly 
in self-defense that precedes an armed attack.47  Adherents to the imminent 
threat school conclude that, by parsing this practice, states may be seen either 
accepting or tolerating the use of military force by a state against another state 
when faced with an imminent armed attack.48  Thus, Thomas Franck writes: 
 
States seem willing to accept strong evidence of the imminence of 
an overpowering attack as tantamount to the attack itself, allowing 
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a demonstrably threatened state to respond under Article 51 as if 
the attack had already occurred, or at least to treat such 
circumstances, when demonstrated, as mitigating the system’s 
judgment of the threatened state’s pre-emptive response.49
   
At the same time, adherents to this school are unwilling to expand the meaning 
of Article 51 beyond the concept of responding to an imminent armed attack.50  
For them, accepting the legality of preemptive self-defense would place the law 
on a very slippery slope, taking us back into the pre-Charter world in which 
nations resorted to warfare for “just” causes.51  Without the immediacy of an 
attack, states must try to predict a future threat based on intelligence that will 
always be tentative and often inaccurate.52  Further, in rejecting the concept of 
preemptive self-defense, the imminent threat school relies in part on the 
customary international law doctrine that force must only be used in accordance 
with principles of necessity and proportionality.53  In considering whether force is 
“necessary,” international lawyers ask certain core questions, such as whether 
the act undertaken seeks solely to halt or repel the armed attack,54 and whether 
there were peaceful alternatives available, such as pursuing diplomatic efforts.55  
In considering whether an act of self-defense is proportional, international 
lawyers consider the scale of the defensive force in relation to the act against 
which it is directed.56  Under either principle, the imminent threat school stresses 
that a movement from anticipatory self-defense to preemptive self-defense 
presents troubling and insurmountable conflicts.57  It is simply not possible to 
gauge with any degree of confidence whether an act of preemptive self-defense 
today is necessary to deal with a threat that may not materialize for months or 
years.  Similarly, one cannot gauge whether the act of preemptive self-defense 
today is proportionate to an inchoate future threat.58  As such, preemptive self-
defense cannot be regarded as lawful.  
 
C. The Qualitative Threat School 
 
 Adherents to the qualitative threat school agree with the imminent threat 
school that a state need not await an actual armed attack, but believe that the 
latter school’s requirement of an imminent threat is misplaced.  For the qualitative 
threat school, the world has changed significantly since 1945, particularly with 
the advent of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of global terrorism.  
Adhering to the strictures of the Caroline standard in a contemporary world is a 
recipe for paralysis in the face of grave threats.59  For this school, President John 
Kennedy had it right when he identified the nuclear age as one in which the 
actual firing of a weapon can no longer be the touchstone for determining 
whether a nation is in peril.60  Rather than emphasize just the temporal nature of 
a future attack, this school looks to other qualitative factors,61 such as the 
probability that an attack will occur at some future point, the availably of non-
forcible means for addressing the situation, and the magnitude of harm that the 
attack would inflict.62  Where those qualitative factors indicate that there is a high 
probability of a future, highly destructive attack, a state may act as necessary 
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and proportionate in preemptive self-defense.  According to this school, 
accepting this approach to self-defense would result in a greater, not lesser 
likelihood of maintaining world public order because it would serve to deter state 
and non-state actors from embarking on programs likely to lead to armed 
conflict.63
 
 For this school, state practice since 1945--such as the U.S. “quarantine” of 
Cuba, the 1989 U.S invasion of Panama,64 and the U.S. attacks against Libya in 
1986, Iraq in 1993,65 and Sudan and Afghanistan in 199866--supports the 
acceptance of preemptive self-defense because there was no imminent attack 
against which the state in those incidents was defending.  Although many states 
opposed such uses of force (and most incidents involved deployment of force by 
just a single actor, the United States), this school nevertheless sees those 
incidents as evincing a degree of global tolerance of preemptive self-defense in 
appropriate circumstances. 
 
 The qualitative threat school sees its views as simply extending the 
position expressed by the imminent threat school, so as to take account of the 
full spectrum of potential armed attacks. If one were to try to represent 
graphically the views of the qualitative threat school, one might develop a three-
dimensional graph reflecting on three axes three principal factors of relevance in 
determining the legality of an act of preemptive self-defense: (1) the imminence 
of an attack (the higher it is, preemptive force is more acceptable); (2) the level of 
coercive force used in response (the lower it is, preemptive force is more 
acceptable); and (3) the threat to the existence of the responding state (the 
higher it is, preemptive force is more acceptable).   
 
D. The “Charter-is-Dead” School 
 
 Finally, there is a school of thought that sees the rules on the use of force 
embedded in the Charter as completely devoid of any legally significant 
normative value.  In 1945 these rules might have had some cachet, but the 
practice of states over the course of the past sixty years can only lead to a 
conclusion that states do not adhere to the U.N. Charter in any legally meaningful 
way and, therefore, the rules have fallen into desuetude.  States may say that the 
rules exist and that they are adhering to them,67 but this is simply empty rhetoric, 
a public relations ploy designed to mask the reality of states simply pursuing their 
political interests.  Michael Glennon writes: 
 
The Charter’s use of force rules have been widely and regularly 
disregarded.  Since 1945, two-thirds of the members of the United 
Nations--126 states out of 189--have fought 291 interstate conflicts 
in which over 22 million people have been killed.  In every one of 
those conflicts at least one belligerent necessarily violated the 
Charter.  In most of those conflicts, most of the belligerents claim to 
act in self-defense.  States’ earlier intent, expressed in words, has 
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been superseded by their later intent, expressed in deeds.68
 
 As a consequence, the “Charter-is-dead” school sees no legal impediment 
to engaging in self-defense, anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense, 
whenever a state perceives a need to protect the well-being of its people.  Our 
global civilization may evolve such that states, powerful and less powerful alike, 
can reach consensus on international rules concerning the use of force (perhaps 
through effective enforcement mechanisms), but until then there is no point in 
trying to split legal hairs about the meaning of Article 51. 
 
IV. Can the Schools Be Reconciled? Confronting Methodological 
Problems in Assessing State Practice 
 
 The strikingly divergent views on the legality of preemptive self-defense no 
doubt have several causal explanations.  International law as a whole suffers 
from the lack of authoritative decision-makers, such as a supreme court with 
plenary power to decide controversial questions of either legal process or 
substance, thus making harder a convergence of views.  Further, international 
law on the use of force presents particular difficulties in promoting state fidelity to 
a normative structure given that adherence to norms is under the greatest stress 
when issues of national security are at stake.  Finally, the norms may not be 
static in nature.  Whether September 11 can be viewed as a “constitutional 
moment” for international law--meaning a moment in which seismic shifts in 
international law occurred without any formal amendment--is unclear, but the rise 
of global terrorism represented by those attacks challenges many of the 
conventional assumptions upon which international law has been based. 
 
 Despite these many factors, a central reason for these divergences of 
view may well be that international lawyers are not explaining the methodology 
that they are employing in determining the state of the law, are not recognizing 
that their disagreement with other international lawyers arises largely from the 
use of different methodologies and are not articulating why one methodology is 
superior to another.  In particular, to the extent that state practice is deemed 
significant for purposes of interpreting the U.N. Charter or determining the 
emergence of a new customary rule of law, international lawyers rarely explain 
their view as to the circumstances that merit using state practice to establish an 
evolution in the state of the law and too often provide only a cursory analysis of 
such practice to see if those circumstances are met.  Unfortunately, in reading 
the literature one cannot help but feel that international lawyers are often coming 
to this issue with firm predispositions as to whether anticipatory self-defense or 
preemptive self-defense should or should not be legal and then molding their 
interpretation of state practice to fit the predispositions.  
 
 Ideally, international lawyers would agree upon a narrative explanatory 
protocol that would set forth a coherent structure for analyzing and configuring 
state practice, as has been done in the field of international relations theory.69  
 T-12
Among other things, developing such a protocol may allow international lawyers 
to move away from a binary discussion of whether preemptive self-defense is 
lawful or unlawful, to one that explores the subtleties and nuances of how states 
react to varying levels of such force being used in different kinds of factual 
scenarios.  The purpose of this section is to identify some of the key issues that 
arise in assessing methodology and state practice on this topic in the hope that it 
may promote the pursuit of an explanatory protocol and in turn more rigorous 
analyses by international lawyers and more convergence in the positions taken 
by them regarding the legality of preemptive self-defense.70  Through greater 
convergence in the views taken by international lawyers, the normative standards 
set by international law may become clearer and more helpful for states in 
ordering their relations. 
 
A. The Problem of Clarifying Methodology
 
 Most international lawyers are taught that when faced with a question of 
whether a particular treaty has been violated (such as the U.N. Charter), one is to 
focus on the “ordinary meaning” of the terms of the treaty, in their context and in 
light of the treaty’s “object and purpose.”71  Moreover, one may also take into 
account “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”72 Virtually 
all international lawyers writing on the doctrine of preemptive self-defense either 
consciously or unconsciously use some elements of this approach to treaty 
interpretation, but they often adopt a particular component of the methodology 
that is useful for advancing their position on preemptive self-defense and avoid 
emphasizing (or even recognizing) other components.  An emphasis on the text 
of the treaty is sometimes referred to as a “textual” or “literal” approach, and an 
emphasis on the object and purpose of the treaty is an “effective” or “teleological” 
approach.73
 
 Thus, the “strict constructionist” school heavily relies on the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of Article 51, which, as discussed above, appears to 
require an “armed attack” prior to engaging in a right of self-defense.74 For the 
strict constructionist, the language of Article 51 presents a high hurdle over which 
the other schools cannot leap.  Yet, this school tends to downplay or ignore the 
other elements relevant to treaty analysis, particularly the possibility that over 
time states may reinterpret Article 51 through their practice.  Since 1945, states 
have deviated from the language of the Charter in many ways that are found 
acceptable by states, ranging from the practice of permanent Members 
abstaining (rather than concurring) on substantive issues decided by the Security 
Council75 to the reading of UN Charter Article 23’s reference to “the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics” as meaning now the “Russian Federation”76 to the 
use of conflict resolution techniques nowhere contemplated in the Charter, such 
as U.N.-authorized “peacekeeping” forces, the General Assembly’s use of the 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution77 or U.N. authorizations to military forces operating 
under national commands.  
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 The strict constructionist normally reviews some of the state practice since 
1945, but finds such practice too sparse or unconvincing to establish a 
reinterpretation of Article 51.78  The strict constructionist, however, would be 
more convincing by explaining clearly his methodology for examining state 
practice (such as by confronting several of the problems identified below) and 
indicating why a norm favoring, for example, the bestowal of Security Council 
authority on states operating under national commands is deemed lawful under 
that methodology, whereas preemptive self-defense is not.  Moreover, the strict 
constructionist often stresses evidence within the negotiating history of the 
Charter that favors a restrictive reading of Article 51, even though standard treaty 
interpretation disfavors reference to such history absent ambiguity in the text or 
absurdity in application of the text.79  The strict constructionist should confront the 
fact that subsequent state practice holds a higher place under standard treaty 
interpretation than negotiating history and should candidly assess whether the 
ordinary meaning of Article 51 is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative 
interpretations. 
 
 The “imminent threat” school also dwells somewhat on the ordinary 
meaning of Article 51, but stresses the term “inherent right” of self-defense and 
uses such language to bootstrap in the pre-Charter standard of self-defense 
reflected in the Caroline incident in support of its position.80  Yet, the “imminent 
threat” school senses the weakness in focusing on the language of Article 51 and 
thus moves quickly in its methodology to post-1945 state practice, typically 
providing a more detailed account of that practice than the strict constructionist.81  
Here too, however, “imminent threat” theorists usually do not examine their 
methodology for assessing state practice; it remains unclear exactly what 
elements of state practice are relevant and why.  Like strict constructionists, 
imminent threat theorists would be more convincing if they set forth a cogent 
methodology, explained how that methodology fit with respect to issues other 
than anticipatory self-defense and then used the methodology to demonstrate 
why anticipatory self-defense is permissible. 
 
 The “qualitative threat” school downplays the ordinary meaning of Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter--even denigrates reliance on such language as a “push 
button” approach to legal analysis82—-and further downplays post-1945 state 
practice, no doubt realizing that neither is particularly useful in establishing a right 
of preemptive self-defense.  Instead, the qualitative threat school at its heart 
argues that preemptive self-defense is lawful because the “object and purpose” 
of Article 51 is to maintain each state’s inherent right of self-defense.83  They 
believe that in a world with WMD and terrorists acting secretly and with state 
support the only reasonable way of achieving this purpose is to permit 
preemptive self-defense.84   
 
A central problem with this approach is that reasonable minds disagree on 
the object and purpose of Article 51.  For the strict constructionist school, the 
object and purpose of Article 51 is to “cut to a minimum the unilateral use of force 
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in international relations,”85 which is best served by precluding both anticipatory 
self-defense and preemptive self-defense.  At the end of the day, the qualitative 
threat school must confront why its “reasonable” interpretation of the Charter’s 
object and purpose is superior to that of others.  The most plausible means for 
doing so would be to establish that the “qualitative threat” interpretation has been 
widely adopted by states, which in turn should lead this school into identifying 
and demonstrating a methodology of assessing state practice. 
 
 The “Charter-is-dead” school is deeply interested in post-1945 state 
practice, to the point of finding that such practice has completely upended 
whatever normative rules emerged in 1945.  As noted above, for this school 
there is such widespread evidence in state practice of a departure from Charter 
norms that the norms have no meaning.86  Therefore, preemptive self-defense is 
lawful (or at least cannot be considered unlawful).  But this school typically does 
not advance a methodology of legal interpretation that can be seen as holding 
true with respect to international law and that therefore is appropriate to apply to 
preemptive self-defense.  For instance, this school’s reference to “291 interstate 
conflicts” since 1945 might prove that Charter rules on the use of force have no 
normative value, but on the same logic, perhaps the lack of, say, 582 interstate 
conflicts proves that such rules have normative value.87  In other words, laws are 
broken all the time; in the United States in 2002 there were 16,204 murders and 
2,151,875 burglaries.88  But the fact of law violation--even widespread law 
violation--is not commonly viewed as proving that the law does not exist or that it 
does not have an effect in conditioning the behavior of those to whom it is 
addressed.89  For example, if the speed limit on a road is 55 miles per hour, but it 
is widely accepted that one may travel at 60 miles per hour without 
repercussions, then the speed limit has established a normative standard (55 
plus 5) that individuals accept as appropriate for judging deviant behavior. 
 
 To seriously consider the relevance of interstate conflict since 1945, it 
would help to know whether there were instances where interstate conflict did not 
occur because an aggressor state found unacceptable the consequences of 
violating the non-aggression norm.  It would help to know whether the existence 
of global norms on the use of force have, in some sense, seeped into the 
“collective consciousness” of global society. If so, then perhaps leaders today (as 
opposed to their predecessors of a century ago) are more apt to abide by the 
norm than they would in its absence, peoples are more apt to resist leaders who 
depart from the norm, and states are more apt to condemn other states that 
depart from the norm even though such departures inevitably occur.  One might 
want to know in how many interstate conflicts since 1945 the norm provided a 
basis for galvanizing global reaction to the resort to force, whether in the 
dramatic form of the U.N.-authorized coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 
1991 or the insistent pressure brought to bear on Eritrea and Ethiopia during 
1998-2000.  Even with respect to resort to force by powerful states, one might 
posit that raw power may be occasionally used, but that because deviation from 
the norm promotes instability and escalation, such states more often apply their 
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power within the framework of the normative system.90  The “Charter-is-dead” 
school is correct that we cannot simply assume these things;91 they must, if 
possible, be demonstrated.92  At the same time, it is not convincing simply to 
assume that state conduct is not affected by norms on the use of force, 
especially because states repeatedly and consistently assert that the norms of 
the Charter are relevant and applicable and because there are instances where 
adherence to the norms seem quite important to states.93  Close analysis of state 
practice would appear to be the best way for the “Charter-is-dead” school to 
prove that the rules of the Charter are indeed dead. 
 
 It would also be useful to clarify whether state practice since 1945 is 
relevant for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of the Charter or, 
alternatively, for the purpose of determining whether a new norm of customary 
international law has emerged that supersedes the obligations set forth in the 
Charter, and if so whether it makes any difference.  To the extent that there is 
discussion of this issue, the strict constructionist school may resort to the notion 
of jus cogens94 as a means of arguing that a new rule of customary international 
law cannot emerge because states may not deviate from the strict 
constructionist’s interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51,95 but the other schools 
may question whether the emergent custom really deviates from the U.N. Charter 
or may challenge the very notion of jus cogens.96  In any event, most discussions 
of preemptive self-defense tend to glide over this issue, even though it is central 
to the question of why and how one is considering state practice. 
 
 The brief discussion above suggests that there is a common component 
among the four schools of thought: the general lack of attention to the 
methodological approach in assessing the legality of preemptive self-defense 
and an unwillingness to explain why one approach is superior to another.  At the 
same time, each of the four schools appears interested, to a degree, in the role 
of state practice since 1945, such that if better agreement existed among the 
schools regarding how such practice should be treated, it might be possible to 
see some convergence among them.97  Thus, if the “strict constructionist” and 
the “imminent threat” theorist can agree that post-1945 state practice matters, 
then focusing on and perhaps reaching agreement how such practice should be 
assessed would be a helpful step prior to actually assessing the practice.  
Likewise, the “qualitative threat” theorist may downplay state practice of the kind 
typically raised in discussions of preemptive self-defense, but if the qualitative 
threat theorist could convince the other schools that state practice should be 
viewed as broader than just actual incidents of state conduct so as to encompass 
evidence of broader expectations and beliefs of governments and peoples, then 
the qualitative threat theorist might be positioned to demonstrate that state 
practice supports preemptive self-defense.  With these observations in mind, the 
remaining portions of this section focus on some of the problems that must be 
confronted in taking state practice in this area seriously.98
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B. The Problem of Relying on What States Say Versus What They Do 
 
 In assessing whether states in the past have engaged in anticipatory or 
preemptive self-defense, international lawyers are divided over whether, in 
assessing an incident of state practice, one should focus on the legal justification 
asserted by the state undertaking a use of force or, rather, look past that 
justification to try to ascertain what decision-makers actually believed about what 
was legally permissible.99  In other words, if a state undertakes an action in a 
situation that on its face appears to be anticipatory or preemptive self-defense 
(i.e., there is no factual basis for the existence of a prior armed attack), and the 
state nevertheless claims that it is acting in self-defense against an armed attack, 
international lawyers differ on whether this demonstrates adherence to the 
traditional norm of self-defense against an armed attack (albeit mistaken self-
defense) or tacitly demonstrates adherence to a new norm of anticipatory or 
preemptive self-defense.100  A more robust exchange among international 
lawyers as to whether a state’s asserted legal justification is the exclusive 
touchstone when assessing state practice may help in promoting better 
convergences in their views. 
 
 For example, in her analysis of why state practice does not support a right 
of anticipatory self-defense, Christine Gray principally focuses on what states say 
they are doing, because the 
 
reluctance expressly to invoke anticipatory self-defense is in itself a clear 
indication of the doubtful status of this justification for the use of force.  
States take care to try to secure the widest possible support; they do not 
invoke a doctrine that they know will be unacceptable to the vast majority 
of states.101
 
Gray then reviews various incidents sometimes referred to as demonstrating 
anticipatory self-defense, such as the 1967 Israeli strikes against Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria and finds that because the attacking state (e.g., Israel) publicly stated 
that it had been the victim of a prior armed attack, the incident cannot stand as 
an example of anticipatory self-defense.102  
 
 This approach to assessing state practice may have the benefit of 
simplicity; one simply looks for the publicly asserted legal justification by the 
relevant state actor and decides whether that statement asserts the emergence 
of a new norm.  In particular, one might focus exclusively on the legal justification 
presented by a state in its report to the Security Council, which is supposed to 
occur as part of the state’s obligation under U.N. Charter Article 51.103  At the 
same time, there may be differing legal justifications advanced by different 
branches or agencies of a government, legal justifications may change over time, 
and, even if a single justification is asserted, the justification may either be too 
simple in nature (“we are acting consistent with the U.N. Charter”) or too diverse 
in nature (“our actions are legally justified for a variety of reasons”), such that 
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drawing a definitive conclusion becomes problematic.104  Yet, assuming that one 
can divine a single stated legal justification, reliance solely on that justification 
raises important questions.  If it were the case that states were repeatedly and 
consistently engaging in anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense and 
yet simply stating that such action was in response to an armed attack, even 
when it was not, is it really correct simply to rely on the asserted legal justification 
when determining the operative rule?  If the law on the books provides for a 
speed limit of 55 miles per hour, but a driver says that “I am not speeding” when 
the driver is going 60 miles per hour and there are no repercussions in doing so, 
it would seem that the better advice when someone asks “how fast can I go?” is 
that the normative system allows one to go 60 miles per hour.  The reluctance of 
states to assert a legal justification that adopts a new norm may reflect a state’s 
belief that there is no such norm, but it may also reflect the reality that during the 
time when states in transition from an old norm to a new, states wish to act in 
accordance with the new norm without being labeled as acting unlawfully, and 
thus seek to portray their acts as complying with the old norm.  
 
 The other schools appear much less focused on what a state says about 
its actions and more focused on what a state does.  For example, Thomas 
Franck finds that the 1967 Israeli strikes were a precedent of anticipatory self-
defense because Israel’s argument that it was the victim of an armed attack “was 
difficult to credit,” and that other “words and actions” demonstrated an Israeli 
acceptance of the right of anticipatory self-defense.105  Similarly, in considering 
the relevance of the U.S. “quarantine” of Cuba in 1962, some international 
lawyers note that the United States based its official legal justification on a theory 
of “regional enforcement action” under Chapter VIII of the Charter and thus find 
that the quarantine is not a precedent for preemptive self-defense,106 but others 
find such a justification not credible and therefore look past it to support a right of 
anticipatory self-defense107 or preemptive self-defense.108  Indeed, the entire 
“New Haven” school of international law as policy science was built upon peeling 
away the formalistic rules advanced by states so as to ascertain the true rules 
upon which states actually operate.109  Yet, as discussed in the next sub-section, 
the difficulty with this approach is in figuring out exactly what states are doing.110
 
 This problem of whether to focus on what states say as opposed to what 
they do may account for why some international lawyers state unequivocally that 
the U.S. government has consistently supported a prohibition on the preemptive 
self-defense,111 but others have asserted that the U.S. government has claimed a 
right of preemptive self-defense starting in the 1980s.112  Still others see the 
United States as having engaged in preemptive self-defense from the earliest 
days of its history.113  The recent invasion of Iraq highlights this problem.  There 
is a widespread perception that the invasion of Iraq was an implementation of the 
doctrine articulated by the Bush Administration in 2002.114  Indeed, when 
President Bush announced to the nation that military operations against Iraq had 
begun in March 2003, he said: 
 
 T-18
The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not 
live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with 
weapons of mass murder.  We will meet that threat now, with our 
Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not 
have to meet it later with armies of firefighters and police and 
doctors on the streets of our cities.115
 
At the same time, when explaining the legal basis for its action against Iraq under 
international law, the United States did not assert that the invasion of Iraq was 
permissible under international law because of an evolved right of preemptive 
self-defense.116  Rather, the United States asserted that the invasion was lawful 
because it was authorized by the Security Council,117 a theory also maintained by 
the other members of the U.S.-led coalition.118  At most, it seems that some of 
the U.S. government’s statements on the legality of the action contained cryptic 
references suggesting legal authority other than that emanating from Security 
Council resolutions, but the terms “anticipatory self-defense” or “preemptive self-
defense” are never used.119  Consequently, it is no surprise that some 
international lawyers believe that the invasion of Iraq provides no precedent for a 
right of preemptive self-defense,120 but others assert that it does.121
 
C. The Problem of Figuring Out What States Are Actually Doing
  
 If international lawyers look past a state’s asserted legal justification to find 
out what states are actually doing, they may avoid some of the concerns noted 
above, but they then must confront additional concerns.  Is the inquiry seeking to 
determine objectively, without reference to a state’s decision-makers’ subjective 
attitudes, whether the state’s conduct in using force demonstrates the 
emergence of a new legal norm?  Or is the inquiry seeking to determine the 
attitudes of the state’s relevant decision-makers, which might encompass 
attitudes as to why the state is using force or why its conduct is lawful?122  In 
other words, in considering the action against Iraq in 2003, are we simply asking 
whether the United States embarked on a use of force in a situation that looks 
like preemptive self-defense?  Or are we asking whether U.S. decision-makers 
undertook such action with a belief that they were preempting a future threat or 
that preemptive self-defense was lawful under the U.N. Charter, regardless of 
whether the official U.S. legal justification advanced a different theory?123  If we 
are interested in decision-makers’ attitudes, then we must further decide whether 
to focus on the heads of state, ministers, legal advisers, legislators or the general 
public.  The imminent threat and qualitative threat schools might be more 
convincing to the strict constructionist and Charter-is-dead schools if they 
elaborated on exactly how such an inquiry should be conducted (e.g., by 
explaining which tools, such as social science techniques, should be brought to 
bear) and then conducted such an inquiry.  Indeed, the Charter-is-dead school 
doubts whether such an inquiry is even possible and suggests that if it were 
conducted successfully, the answer might be that decision-makers are acting 
without any thought as to “the law.”124
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 Leaving aside the issue of the relevant decision-makers’ attitudes, a 
related concern is that it may prove extremely difficult to draw lines between 
“traditional” self-defense and anticipatory or preemptive self-defense in assessing 
what states are actually doing.  International lawyers should clearly explain how 
one determines that a state is acting in “anticipation” or in “preemption” of a 
future action, rather than responding to a prior act.  International lawyers would 
do well to recognize that traditional acts of self-defense often are concerned with 
the prevention of future coercion, while acts of preemptive self-defense invariably 
are concerned in part with preexisting coercion.  Finding an appropriate 
delineation between the two is more difficult than international lawyers are 
usually willing to admit. 
 
 Thus, a standard formulation of what constitutes a “defensive” response 
refers to steps taken to repel an attacker, but state practice suggests that this is 
far too restrictive in nature.125  It is commonly accepted that, when one state 
invades another state, the invaded state may respond by not just repelling the 
invader, but by entering the invader’s territory for reasons such as setting up a 
buffer zone until an armistice is concluded.126  If the invader has been repulsed, 
however, why is a buffer zone allowed?  It is a defensive means of preventing 
future attacks, even long after the guns have fallen silent.  Further, even if a state 
does not invade another state, it is commonly accepted that if a state bombs a 
military base of another state, the second state may respond in proportionate 
self-defense, not as a means of stopping the initial bombing (which has already 
ended), but to deter and prevent such future attacks.  Whether one classifies 
such a response as “defensive armed reprisal,”127 “defensive retaliation”128 or an 
act “undertaken in the framework of an ongoing armed conflict,”129 the point is 
that the response is future-oriented, seeking to stop acts that are yet to occur. 
 
 Even the ICJ, which is very restrictive in its approach to use of force 
issues, accepts that a series of military raids, in which territory is not occupied, 
might constitute an armed attack that merits self-defense, yet, here too, such a 
response is not repulsion of the prior raids, but anticipation and prevention of 
future ones.130  The ICJ may even accept that it is possible to engage in self-
defense to prevent future mining attacks, after just a single ship has been mined, 
so long as the complaining State can establish who mined the ship and the 
complaining State’s response is necessary and proportionate to the mining.131
 
 The problem of how one characterizes a “defensive” response is even 
more apparent in the context of responding to terrorist attacks, which are 
designed as sudden, single attacks without further sustained paramilitary 
engagement.  For example, consider the United States’ response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  Most international lawyers believe that the 
United States: (1) sustained an armed attack in September 2001 from a terrorist 
group supported by Afghanistan’s de facto government and therefore (2) was 
entitled, under Article 51, to respond in self-defense in November 2001, 
deploying military forces to Afghanistan to eliminate al Qaeda bases and topple 
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the Taliban government that tolerated them.132  This factual sequence of self-
defense is relatively straightforward and was accepted by Security Council, 
NATO and the Organization of American States.133  Some international lawyers, 
however, have asserted that the United States’ use of force constituted 
preemptive self-defense because the “armed attack against the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon was over, and no defensive action could have 
ameliorated its effects.”134  
 
 This disagreement raises the question of what factual continuum should 
be used in considering whether an action is being taken “in anticipation” or 
“preemptively,” which then raises the question of what a state may do when it 
engages in self-defense.  Most international lawyers would not conclude, for 
example, that on December 8, 1941, the United States had no basis for acting in 
self-defense against Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, simply because the attack 
was over and no defensive action could ameliorate its effects.  Nor did the United 
States lose its right to engage in self-defense, even though it took many weeks 
for a buildup of ground and air forces in the Pacific before the United States 
could meaningfully respond to Japan’s attack and months before General 
Doolittle’s raid on Tokyo.135  Rather, in these situations, there is a sense that--
given the fact of a prior attack--the attacked state must be able to engage in any 
action that is necessary to preclude any such attacks in the future, to wit 
defeating Japan militarily.  Whether one is considering the World Trade Center or 
Pearl Harbor, there is an idea, embedded within standard notions of self-defense, 
that a state, having been attacked, may ward off future similar attacks through 
defensive action.  Granted, the likelihood of future attacks is much more apparent 
when an attack already has occurred, but nevertheless the defensive response 
focuses on preventing future attacks, not simply repulsing the prior attack.  
Conversely, acts of preemptive self-defense, likely by definition, entail some 
preceding action by the state or group against whom the action is taken. 
 
 If this is true, then the salient question asks at what point this traditional 
right of self-defense transitions into one of anticipatory self-defense or 
preemptive self-defense.  In 1986, a bomb exploded in a German discotheque 
frequented by U.S. servicemen.136  Thereafter, the United States bombed 
Libya.137  Assuming that the initial bombing is regarded as an “armed attack” 
(which raises a different issue), is the U.S. action best regarded as traditional 
self-defense against a pre-existing attack, as some international lawyers claim, or 
is it preemptive self-defense against unknown attacks that may occur at some 
unspecified point in the future, as other international lawyers claim?138  If one 
takes at face value NATO’s claim that it was at least partially acting in self-
defense when it bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Serbia & 
Montenegro in 1999,139 is such action “anticipatory” given that the FRY had not 
yet unleashed its forces in Kosovo140 or not because of the FRY’s prior 
aggression in the Balkans in the course of the 1990s?  Assuming that the U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003 is best seen as a form of self-defense under Article 
51, is it preemptive or is it responsive to prior Iraqi armed attacks on its neighbors 
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during the 1980s and 1990s, along with the threat created by its use of, and 
efforts to acquire, WMD?  Until we achieve greater clarity in classifying such 
conduct, convergence of views about states’ conduct in this area will be difficult. 
 
D. The Problem of Accounting for Global Reactions
 
 Assuming that international lawyers can sort out how best to analyze the 
conduct of a state that resorts to a use of force, a further problem arises in 
gauging the reaction of other states to that state’s conduct.  In situations where 
arguably the state resorts to anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense, 
the strict constructionist school dismisses that action as law-breaking, rather than 
law-making, by reference to whether other states have accepted the conduct as 
lawful or not.141  This approach appears to be methodologically acceptable, 
whether one is considering state practice for purposes of interpreting the U.N. 
Charter or for determining the existence of a new customary rule of international 
law, but the same types of problems identified above, with respect to analyzing a 
state’s conduct in using force, is now amplified by having to determine all other 
states’ counter-practices in response to that force.  Are we concerned only with 
the official positions of other states or do we wish to look behind them?  Are we 
looking for legal interpretations or are the reactions of foreign states that might be 
construed as simply political statements relevant as well?  When a foreign state 
condemns a use of force, it may express that condemnation in legal terms or it 
may not (one can condemn a lawful act for political, moral or other reasons).  
Moreover, should one construe a state’s silence in the face of a use of force as 
tacit acceptance, indifference or meaningless?  Should we give equal weight to 
all states’ views, so that tiny Andorra’s voice is equal to China’s and authoritarian 
governments’ perspectives are just as valuable as those of democratic 
governments?  The reality is that no international lawyer conducts a systematic 
review of the reactions of all 190 states to just one state’s use of force, nor 
explains how, if such a review were done, we should deal with silence and 
conflicting views among states.  Instead, international lawyers often look at the 
practice of just a few readily available states.142  One has to worry that the 
availability of states’ views may be self-selecting; perhaps states that vehemently 
oppose the use of force are those whose practice is easily located, whereas 
those who approve or are acquiescent leave little trace of their views. 
 
 To avoid some of these difficulties, international lawyers often rely on 
decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly in condemning, or not 
condemning, a particular use of force.143  Nevertheless, use of state practice for 
treaty interpretation should focus on the states that are parties to the treaty, and 
not on other states, organizations or persons.  As such, it is arguable that 
decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly or of a regional 
organization, as to whether a state is acting consistently with Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, are not directly relevant or should be placed lower in the hierarchy 
of relevant state practice.  They might only be relevant if the state’s action had a 
bearing upon the provisions of the U.N. Charter that is relevant to that U.N. organ 
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or regional organization.144  These decisions might be used as surrogates for 
providing information about what states themselves actually think, but they 
should be recognized as indirect evidence of relevant state practice.  And, again, 
at their heart, the General Assembly and the Security Council are political, not 
legal, organs; it is not always clear if they are expressing a view as to whether a 
particular use of force is a violation of the U.N. Charter. 
 
 On the other hand, perhaps the Security Council’s decisions should, in 
some sense, be granted special significance given the role of the Security 
Council in maintaining international peace and security under the U.N. Charter.145  
Perhaps when joining the Charter, states delegate to the Security Council the 
right to express their views on what conduct falls within or outside the norms set 
by the U.N. Charter, in which case we should downgrade the practice of states 
who are not Members of the Security Council at the time of the use of force in 
question.146  Yet, to the extent that the views of an organ such as the Security 
Council are found to be particularly relevant, are only the resolutions actually 
adopted by the organ relevant, or are the individual views of the Security Council 
Members significant as well?  If the views of the Security Council Members are 
indeed relevant, should we grant even greater relevance to the Security Council’s 
permanent members, which have been recognized as having a special status in 
the maintenance of peace and security?147  Sorting through issues regarding the 
way we assess global state practice is critical to closing the significant gaps 
between the different schools of thought on preemptive self-defense.  
 
E. The Problem of Frequency of Practice
 
 One central problem in analyzing state practice regarding preemptive self-
defense is that traditional state practice on this topic is quite sparse.  For lawyers 
opposed to preemptive self-defense, this lack of practice signals that preemptive 
self-defense is disfavored.148  Yet scarcity of practice does not necessarily reflect 
such a belief; it may just indicate that the circumstances calling for preemptive 
self-defense only infrequently arise.  At the same time, lawyers favoring a right of 
preemptive self-defense may believe they have identified certain instances where 
such action is condoned, but the infrequency of such practice makes it hard to 
ascertain a clear emergent consensus on the matter. 
 
 Four avenues of addressing the infrequency problem may be fruitful for 
analyses in this area.  First, as indicated in the prior sections, each incident of 
potential preemptive self-defense should be more carefully analyzed so as to 
discern not just the circumstances of that incident, but also whether the incident 
suggests certain trends and, if so, their nuances.149  It is not enough to recount 
briefly the facts of an incident and a few reactions from some states; more robust 
methodologies can, and should, be employed in determining what the incident 
stands for and how it should be viewed in the context of other incidents.  One 
thoughtful approach may be seen in a genre of study advocated by Michael 
Reisman.150  Perhaps through a higher quality of analysis of incidents of potential 
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preemptive self-defense, the problem of quantity of incidents will be less severe. 
 
 Second, clarifying whether state practice is relevant in interpreting the 
meaning of the Charter or, alternatively, in determining whether a new norm of 
customary international law has emerged, may assist international lawyers when 
considering the frequency of practice necessary to establish a new meaning or 
norm.  If resort to state practice is for the purpose of interpreting the Charter, 
arguably there need not be a high level of frequency of conduct; rather, what is 
needed is practice that “is consistent, and is common to, or accepted by, all the 
parties.”151  Alternatively, if state practice is being used as a means of 
establishing a new norm of customary international law, then there may be an 
expectation of greater repetition and constancy of practice,152 possibly through 
acts and not just words,153 particularly if it is deviating from a treaty to which 
states are parties.  
 
 Third, lawyers should consider expanding the scope of the practice taken 
into consideration when assessing the legality of preemptive self-defense 
because it may provide a much richer base of data upon which to assess legal 
expectations.  Incidents of actual preemptive self-defense are obviously relevant, 
but a careful analysis would also look for other forms of state practice.  For 
example, there may be relevant incidents where states decided that preemptive 
self-defense could be undertaken or where they threatened preemptive self-
defense, even if ultimately such action was not taken.  As discussed in President 
Clinton’s recent memoirs, in 1993 the United States considered a preemptive 
strike against North Korea to disable a potential nuclear weapons program, but 
stepped back from doing so when North Korea entered into an accord with the 
United States.154  Similarly, in February 2003, Japan asserted that it would 
launch a preemptive military action against North Korea if Japan had firm 
evidence North Korea was planning a missile attack.155  Lawyers might 
systematically seek to uncover such decisions and warnings by states so as to 
determine whether states capable of projecting force, when confronted with a 
dangerous, albeit long-term, threat, view their obligations under the U.N. Charter 
as permitting the use of force against that threat, even if force ultimately is not 
deployed.  Alternatively, such analysis might reveal insistent voices in opposition 
to the deployment of such force, whose objections are galvanized by concerns 
with violating global expectations as embodied in the U.N. Charter.  Further, 
relevant state practice might be found in the use of force beyond scenarios of 
anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense.  If state practice can be 
found in other areas, such as humanitarian intervention or rescue of nationals, 
indicating a departure from the apparent norm embedded in Article 51, then 
perhaps all such practice considered collectively can provide better insight into 
general contemporary norms on the use of force, which in turn would be helpful 
in considering preemptive self-defense.  
 
 There may also be relevant state practice separate from incidents of the 
use of force.  Rather than trying to take “snapshots” of government attitudes in 
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reaction to specific incidents, perhaps international lawyers should be seeking 
information about the attitudes of government decision-makers on a day-to-day 
basis, and perhaps with respect to matters of direct concern to them.  For 
example, suppose it were possible to obtain a memorandum from the legal office 
of every foreign ministry of all 191 states that would directly answer the following 
three questions:  
 
 1. If your government was convinced that your country was in 
danger of an imminent attack by a neighboring state, and 
you had the means to act militarily in advance of that attack 
to stop it, would doing so violate your obligations under the 
U.N. Charter? 
 
 2. If your government was convinced that your country was in 
danger of an attack at some point in the next twelve months 
by a neighboring state, and you had the means to act 
militarily in advance of that attack to stop it, would doing so 
violate your obligations under the U.N. Charter? 
 
 3. Do you still regard the U.N. Charter as binding law with 
respect to the use of force by Member States? 
 
 International lawyers might consider whether having those 191 
memoranda would be much better evidence of the status of contemporary norms 
on the use of force than focusing exclusively on actual incidents of anticipatory or 
preemptive self-defense.  Certainly, the answers given by a state in the context 
of itself facing a threat of an attack seems more pertinent than the vote of that 
state’s representative at the U.N. General Assembly, with respect to an incident 
that occurred across the globe (a vote about which the permanent representative 
may not even have instructions from her home government).  If having such 
memoranda would be highly probative, then perhaps international lawyers should 
be thinking about how to go about getting them or something like them. 
 
 Other forms of practice might be considered as well, such as trends in the 
development of new international agreements or the attitudes of states as 
expressed through decisions by international organizations unrelated to specific 
incidents.  For example, there is an extensive web of international agreements on 
WMD, ranging from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty156 to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention157 to the Biological Weapons Convention158 to other related 
instruments,159 all designed to help maintain international peace and security 
among states.  Although none of these instruments expressly authorizes states 
on their own initiative to enforce compliance, and indeed contemplate alternative 
methods for monitoring and exposing compliance, international lawyers might 
consider whether the existence of such widely-adhered to agreements has 
influenced for states the meaning to be placed on Article 51.  Shortly after 
adoption of the U.N. Charter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) 
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asserted that violation of an IAEA convention might be of so grave a character as 
to give rise to a right of self-defense under Article 51.160  The United States also 
took this position.161 International lawyers might study whether such an attitude 
can be found within various international organizations today concerned with 
WMD, whether the use of military force by one or more of the major military 
powers to ensure compliance with WMD obligations is acknowledged or at least 
tacitly accepted by such organizations in their dealings with recalcitrant states, or 
whether, in fact, such a possibility is routinely rejected as unlawful.  
 
 Similarly, there is an extensive web of international agreements directed 
against specific types of terrorist acts, such as hijacking of aircraft,162 sabotage of 
aircraft,163 taking of hostages,164 violent offenses onboard aircraft,165 crimes 
against certain protected persons166 and--most recently--the suppression of 
terrorist bombings167 and the financing of terrorism.168 Although none of these 
instruments expressly authorizes states to use military force against another 
state to prevent terrorist attacks, the conventions typically require states to 
criminalize not just the commission of a terrorist act, but the intent to commit 
such acts, as well as the facilitation and support given to such acts.169  At the 
same time, states’ language with respect to terrorism has become increasingly 
cast in terms of a “war” on terrorism and a need to “combat” terrorists.  Thus, the 
Security Council has repeatedly declared that “acts of international terrorism 
constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in 
the twenty-first century”170 and has called upon states “to work together urgently 
to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation 
and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to 
terrorism.”171  Moreover, the Security Council has expressed its determination to 
“combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts,” and in that context has recognized the inherent right of self-
defense.172  International lawyers might consider whether the existence of widely-
adhered-to agreements outlawing terrorism and the increasingly strident 
premium placed on adhering to such agreements to “combat” such a “threat” to 
international peace has begun to influence the meaning to be placed on Article 
51, the same way that the emergence of human rights treaties has led to 
changing views on the permissibility of humanitarian intervention.173  A close 
analysis of the conclusion of terrorist-related agreements and resolutions might 
lead to a view that the attitudes of states are changing, or might alternatively 
demonstrate that such attitudes are closely hewing to the belief that preemptive 
self-defense is not within the scope of global expectations with respect to 
permissible action. 
 
 Finally, international lawyers might do better at considering the relevance 
of national laws relevant to the issue of preemptive self-defense.  In international 
law, principles of law operating among the national legal systems of states are 
accepted as a source of international law, typically filling in the gaps and 
uncertainties that necessarily exist in a decentralized interstate system.  If one 
were to survey civil law, common law, Islamic law, and the legal systems of 
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Africa and Asia, an international lawyer might uncover useful information about 
societal expectations on how the law should operate in situations involving the 
use of force and self-defense by persons.  Such laws might arise in the context of 
transnational uses of force,174 in the context of the rules of engagement adopted 
as a part of national military regulations and instructions or in the context of 
permissible self-defense by persons under sophisticated national criminal 
laws.175  If there is a consistent pattern of legal systems that accept “self-
defense” as inherently including actions in response to an immediate threat, then 
such information would appear to be of some value in gauging contemporary 
interpretations of Article 51.  Likewise, the inquiry might provide useful 
information on whether self-defense may be preemptive in nature, such as 
national criminal laws allowing a wife to slay an abusive, sleeping husband who 
she thinks, at some point in the future, will in turn slay her.  Of course, there are 
reasons why the patterns discerned in global legal systems may not be 
appropriate; with respect to national criminal laws, states are not persons, and 
persons typically operate within national criminal law systems whereas states do 
not.  Nevertheless, by broadening their scope of inquiry to include general 
principles of law, international lawyers might help close some of the gaps among 
them.  
 
F. The Problem of Recent Versus Distant Practice
 
 Assuming that the above problems can be addressed, international 
lawyers might also consider whether more recent state practice should be given 
greater emphasis than more distant practice.  Whether that practice is in the form 
of actual incidents involving the use of force or other evidence of the attitudes of 
state decision-makers, presumably older practice is less relevant than newer 
practice.  International lawyers, however, rarely discuss state practice in such a 
manner, and instead lump together incidents spanning decades.  Yet, there 
appear to be significant historical periods where global politics have dramatically 
influenced the way states think about uses of force, whether it be the bipolar 
confrontation of the Cold War, the “new world order” of the immediate post-Cold 
War or the post-September 11 period in which we now find ourselves.  Is 
evidence of state practice across these different time periods all of equal weight?  
Should the most distant be discarded as antiquated or should practice within any 
particular period be discarded as aberrant?  
 
 For example, should any examples of anticipatory or preemptive self-
defense during the Cold War, when there was virtually no chance of the Security 
Council authorizing states to use force, now be discarded because the Security 
Council has demonstrated repeatedly since 1990 its willingness to authorize the 
use of force, even if in some circumstances (e.g., the 2003 invasion of Iraq) it 
does not?  Or conversely, to the extent that it is relevant that the Israeli attack on 
the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981 was widely condemned by states at the 
time,176 would it also be relevant if it could be shown that by 1991, after weapons 
inspectors entered Iraq and realized how much progress Iraq had made on the 
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development of nuclear weapons, many states believed that, in hindsight, the 
Israeli attack was a blessing? 
 
G. The Problem of Resort to the Travaux of the Charter
 
 As noted above, treaty interpretation calls for recourse to the preparatory 
work of the treaty (or travaux préparatoires) only when the initial interpretation 
leads to an ambiguous or obscure meaning or to an absurd or unreasonable 
result.177  In the context of construing Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the different 
schools discussed above typically find their own interpretation as unambiguous, 
but that of the other schools as absurd or unreasonable.178  As such, 
international lawyers tend to resort to the negotiating history of the Charter 
(principally the records of the San Francisco Conference in 1945) to bolster their 
existing position.179  Strict constructionists find that the travaux préparatoires 
preclude anticipatory self-defense and preemptive self-defense,180 but imminent 
and qualitative threat theorists find the opposite.181
 
 To the extent that international lawyers see the travaux préparatoires as 
relevant,182 international lawyers might first confront the proposition--for which 
there is some authority--that when interpreting the text of the constitution of an 
international organization, the original intention of the drafters of the constitution 
should not be emphasized, particularly because the parties may increase or 
change, and because such a constitution, by its nature, should not be viewed as 
static.183  If that proposition is correct, then we are better served by inquiring into 
state practice today by the Members of the United Nations, then trying to fathom 
original meanings. 
 
 On the other hand, if we are to explore original meanings, international 
lawyers may wish to broaden their inquiry beyond the official documents tabled at 
the San Francisco Conference, since by doing so they will find that the idea of 
preemptive self-defense was known to those present at San Francisco, and that 
the Charter was drafted so as to preclude such action.184  The impetus for Article 
51 came from the U.S. delegation to the conference in response to certain 
demands from the Latin American delegations.185  In the course of the U.S. 
drafting of the article, U.K. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden apparently argued to 
U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius (the head of the U.S. delegation) that 
the right of self-defense under Article 51 should not be triggered only when there 
was an “armed attack.”186  Eden reportedly indicated that the United Kingdom 
might wish to act in self-defense against potential measures undertaken by the 
USSR to expand its influence in Europe and the Mediterranean.187  
Consequently, Eden wanted Article 51 to allow self-defense against measures 
that fell short of direct aggression.  Stettinius, however, refused to drop the 
reference to “armed attack,” saying that a broader phraseology would allow 
states too great a leeway, including the right to preventive actions, which could 
destroy the viability of the United Nations.188  Indeed, Stettinius reportedly noted 
that both World War I and World War II had begun with preventative attacks.  In 
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the face of Stettinius’ refusal, the United Kingdom backed down.189  To the extent 
that resort is made to such history, international lawyers should consider whether 
similar exchanges and attitudes could be found among the other delegations to 
the San Francisco Conference. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 To the extent that the intervention in Iraq in 2003 is regarded as an act of 
preemptive self-defense, the aftermath of that intervention may presage an era 
where states resist resorting to large-scale preemptive self-defense.  The 
intervention in Iraq highlighted considerable policy difficulties with the resort to 
preemptive self-defense: an inability to attract allies; the dangers of faulty 
intelligence regarding a foreign state’s weapons programs and relations with 
terrorist groups; the political, economic and human costs in pursuing wars of 
choice; and the resistance of a local populace or radicalized factions to what is 
viewed as an unwarranted foreign invasion and occupation.  Preemptive self-
defense may continue to be used by powerful states, however, especially on a 
smaller scale, such as missile attacks against weapons facilities or terrorist 
camps in “rogue” states. 
 
 Resort to such force is “channeled and disciplined by the notions that 
members of a society share about when force is legitimate and what kinds of 
goals it can achieve.”190  In part, those notions are captured by the norms of 
international law because, over time, war has become perceived not as an 
honorable undertaking by states, but as a necessary evil, one to be avoided 
except as a matter of last resort and one that is now circumscribed by legal and 
multilateral frameworks.191  Policy-makers considering a resort to preemptive 
self-defense want to know whether such force will be regarded as internationally 
lawful as a means of predicting its costs and may avoid or at least shape the 
action to minimize those costs. 
 
 Unfortunately, the views of international lawyers are fractured on whether 
preemptive self-defense is lawful.192  Numerically, most international lawyers 
appear to fall into the schools of thought that reject preemptive self-defense, but 
the debate is robust and will no doubt continue.193  As it continues, this essay 
urges international lawyers to focus more on the theory and methodology they 
employ in reaching their conclusions.194  Too often, international lawyers are not 
explaining the basic legal theory they are using for their analysis.195  To the 
extent that state practice since 1945 is a part of that legal theory, international 
lawyers usually do not articulate the methodology that they believe is appropriate 
for assessing incidents of intervention, nor why that methodology is superior to 
other methodologies, prior to embarking on such assessments.196  The discourse 
among international lawyers is uneven, not joined, and at times breezy.  The 
notion of preemptive self-defense raises certain difficult issues of methodology, 
several of which have been noted in this essay.197  Only by grappling squarely 
with such issues of theory and methodology will international lawyers be able to 
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achieve a greater level of convergence in their views, thereby providing policy-
makers with better guidance and laying the groundwork for more stable 
international rules on the use of force. 
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(arguing that any interpretation of Article 2(4) that permits states to use force is 
incompatible with purpose of provision and is therefore untenable); La Charte 
des Nations Unies: Commentaire Article par Article 125 (J. Cot & A. Pellet 
eds., 2d ed. 1991); Leland Goodrich & Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United 
Nations: Commentary and Documents 44-45 (World Peace Foundation, 3d ed. 
1969) (asserting that Article 2(4) was designed to prevent armed conflict, leaving 
very few exceptions to that goal); Oscar Schachter, International Law in 
Theory and Practice 112-13 (1991) (discussing interpretations of Article 2(4) 
and noting that its words qualify as all-inclusive prohibition against force but that 
extent of this prohibition is not clear from textual analysis alone); C. Humphrey 
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 
Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 493 (1952-II). 
 
24. See generally Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United 
Nations Security Council 133-49 (2004) (discussing power of Security Council 
under Chapter VII and “the threshold that triggers Chapter VII action”); see also 
U.N. Charter, supra note 19, art. 39-51, 59 Stat. at 1043-45, T.S. No. 993 
(setting forth U.N. procedures for handling threats to peace, breaches of peace, 
and acts of aggression, including Security Council authorization of use of force 
against states that aggressively threaten peace).  
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25. U.N. Charter, supra note 19, art. 51, 59 Stat. at 1044-45, T.S. No. 993. In its 
entirety, the article reads: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Id. 
 
26. For a detailed presentation of strict constructionist views, see infra notes 27-
36 and accompanying text. 
 
27. Brownlie, supra note 22, at 278; see Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United 
Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 797-98 (Stevens & 
Sons 1950) (arguing that Article 51’s allowance of use of force in self-defense 
applies only when nation faces actual armed attack, and therefore, no “imminent” 
threat of attack can justify armed aggression under Article 51); Lassa 
Oppenheim, International Law vol.2, 156 (H. Lauterpacht, ed., Longmans, 
Green and Co., 7th ed., 1952) (noting that U.N. Charter “confines the right of 
armed self-defence to the case of an armed attack as distinguished from 
anticipated attack or from various forms of unfriendly conduct falling short of 
armed attack”); Hans Wehberg, L’Interdiction du Recours á la Force: Le Principe 
et les Problèmes qui se Posent, 78 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 81 (1951) (finding that self-
defense under Article 51 is impermissible “en cas de simple menace 
d’agression”). 
 
28. Philip Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 166 (Archon Books 1968). 
 
29. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions 156 
(1990). 
 
30. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 167 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 3d ed. 2001); see 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 
supra note 22, at 676 (“An anticipatory right of self-defence would be contrary to 
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the wording of Art. 51 (‘if an armed attack occurs’) . . . .”); id. n.138 (citing 
authorities disfavoring anticipatory self-defense or preemptive self-defense); 
Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility 63 (2004) 
(“[I]f there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence 
to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize 
such action if it chooses to.”).  At the same time, Dinstein would allow for self-
defense in a situation where an attacker “has committed itself to an armed attack 
in an ostensibly irrevocable way” even if the attacker has not crossed the frontier, 
although he is unclear how one would judge that such an attack is irrevocably 
underway.  See Dinstein, supra, at 172 (arguing for legitimacy of “interceptive” 
self-defense under Art. 51 with belief that it would be preposterous to force nation 
to endure potentially crippling first strike simply to preserve their absolute right to 
self defense).  
 
31. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 27) (“[I]t will be necessary to distinguish the most 
grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other 
less grave forms.”); see also Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran 
v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 187-88 (Nov. 6) (ruling that in order for nation to attack 
another nation, it must show that there was armed attack for which other nation is 
responsible).  As noted previously, the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua said that it was not expressing a view with respect to 
the right to defend against an imminent attack.  For a discussion of Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, see supra note 13 and 
accompanying text.  The ICJ, however, confirmed that states do not have a right 
of individual or collective armed response to acts that do not constitute an “armed 
attack.”  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 
I.C.J. at 103, 110 (noting that for one state to legally use force against another 
because of other’s own act, that act in question must be an armed attack).  In 
doing so, the ICJ did not provide a complete definition of what constituted an 
“armed attack.”  On the one hand, the ICJ implied that a “mere frontier incident” 
does not constitute an “armed attack” and stated that providing assistance to 
rebels in the target state in the form of weapons or logistical or other support did 
not constitute an “armed attack.”  See id. at 103-04.  On the other hand, the ICJ 
considered an “armed attack” as occurring when regular armed forces cross an 
international border, or when a state sends armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries that carry out acts of armed force against another state of sufficient 
gravity so as to equate with an actual armed attack by regular forces.  See id. at 
103 (describing actions by state that would constitute armed attack according to 
ICJ); see also 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, supra 
note 22, at 670 (noting that “armed attacks” must be “military actions [that] are on 
a certain scale and have a major effect, and are thus not to be considered mere 
frontier incidents”); Dinstein, supra note 30, at 173-74 (“There is no doubt that, 
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for an illegal use of force to acquire the dimensions of an armed attack, a minimal 
threshold has to be reached . . . . In the absence of an armed attack, self-
defense is not an option available to the victim State . . . .”).  
 
32. For a discussion of the meaning of “armed attack,” see supra note 31 and 
accompanying text. 
 
33. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 544, 545 (1971) (looking to Korean War, 
President Kennedy’s response to Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and War in 
Vietnam as examples of state action after ratification of United Nations Charter). 
 
34. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 141 (2d ed., 
1979) [hereinafter How Nations Behave]; see Antonio Cassese, International 
Law 309 (001) [hereinafter Cassese, International Law] (“If one undertakes a 
perusal of State practice . . . it becomes apparent that such practice does not 
evince agreement among States regarding the interpretation or the application of 
Article 51 with regard to anticipatory self-defence.”); Henkin, supra note 29, at 
156 (“The permissive interpretation of Article 51 has found little favour with 
Governments.”).  But see Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided 
World 230-36 (Clarendon Press 1986) (arguing that consensus is growing for 
allowing anticipatory self-defense).  
 
35. Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 115 (Malcolm 
Evans & Phoebe Okowa, eds., 2000).  By 2004, Gray was less certain about this 
“trend,” and modified her treatise to speak of a clear trend before the terrorist 
attacks of September 11.  See Christine Gray, International Law and the Use 
of Force 133 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter Gray 2d ed.] (“The clear trend in state 
practice before 9/11 was to try to bring the action within Article 51 and to claim 
the existence of an armed attack rather than to argue expressly for a wider right 
under customary international law.”). 
 
36. Cassese, International Law, supra note 34, at 310-11. 
 
37. For a listing of authorities falling into this school, see 1 The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary, supra note 22, at 666 n.28. 
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38. See D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 187 (Manchester 
Univ. Press 1959) (stating reference to “inherent right” in Article 51 indicates “an 
existing right, independent of the Charter and not the subject of an express 
grant”). 
 
39. For a pre-1945, and thus pre-U.N. Charter, example of defense against an 
imminent threat, see infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 
40. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2 
John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law 412 (1906).  The incident 
involved an assertion by the United Kingdom that its attack in U.S. territory on the 
schooner Caroline was permissible self-defense because the schooner had 
previously been used (and might be used again) to ferry supplies across the 
border to Canada to rebels who were fighting U.K. rule in Canada.  See Moore, 
supra, at 409-412; see also Daniel Webster, The Works of Daniel Webster 
292-303.  Webster rejected the U.K. assertion, observing that at the time of the 
attack, the Caroline was not engaged in or being prepared for such transport.  In 
support of his views, Webster cited to eminent scholars of international law, 
including Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel.  For a view that anticipatory self-defense 
did not exist even under pre-Charter customary international law, see Roberto 
Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] II (1) Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n. 13, at 65-67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/333. 
 
41. See, e.g., Bowett, supra note 38, at 188-89 (1959) (arguing that Article 51 
definitely allows right to self-defense and that this right has always presumed to 
be anticipatory); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force: 
International Law After Iraq, 53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 785, 792 (2004) (asserting 
that Article 51 permits anticipatory self-defense, as matter of customary law, so 
long as it is proportionate response to threat). 
 
42. See Brunnée & Toope, supra note 41, at 792 (claiming that even though 
Article 51 specifically refers to armed attack, there is no impairment of right of 
anticipatory self-defense when attack is imminent). 
 
43. See J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 419 (H. Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) 
(analyzing other interpretations of French text and finding room for uncertainty in 
interpretation). 
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44. For a further discussion of the inherent right to self-defense as included in 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, see supra notes 41-43 and 
accompanying text. 
 
45. How Nations Behave, supra note 34, at 143-44; see Julius Stone, 
Aggression and World Order 99 (1958).  The author posits: 
Suppose military intelligence at the Pentagon 
received indisputable evidence that a hostile State 
was poised to launch intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, at a fixed zero hour only 24 hours ahead, 
against New York, Boston and Washington, would it 
be an aggressor under the Charter if it refused to wait 
until those cities had received the missiles before it 
reacted by the use of force? 
Id. 
 
46. For a discussion of these incidents, see Christopher Greenwood, 
International Law and the United States' Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. Va. 
L. Rev. 933 (1986) (discussing situation surrounding air attack, domestic and 
world reaction to air strike, claim by United States that act was justified under 
article 51 of United Nations Charter and other justifications for attack); William V. 
O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 
Va. J. Int'l L. 421, 464-65 (1990)  (summarizing position of United States and its 
allies versus position of many Third World and Communist States). 
 
47. For a further discussion of these attacks and the international legal issues 
implicated by them, see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 
48. For a discussion of the views of one adherent to the imminent threat school 
regarding the acceptability of the use of force in the face of an imminent armed 
attack, see infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 
49. Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats 
and Armed Attacks 107 (2002) [hereinafter Recourse to Force]; What 
Happens Now?, supra note 19, at 619 (“The principle of anticipatory self-defense 
has been known to international law for almost two centuries and has gained a 
certain credibility, despite the restrictive terms of Charter Article 51.  This 
credibility is augmented both by contemporary state practice and by deduction 
from the logic of modern weaponry.”). 
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50. See What Happens Now?, supra note 19, at 619 (finding Bush 
Administration’s doctrine of preemptive self-defense to be expanding 
exponentially range of permissible action); Georg Nolte, Preventive Use of Force 
and Preventive Killings: Moves into a Different Legal Order, 5 Theoretical 
Inquiries in L. 111 (2004). (arguing that Bush doctrine and Israeli policy of 
“targeted killing” risk transforming indispensable foundations of international law 
on use of force and human rights). 
 
51. See Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 Eur. 
J. Int’l. L. 227, 238 (2003) (asserting that creating a rule that did not provide a 
“workable definition of permissible force might end the abolition of the prohibition 
of the use of force altogether”); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 74-75 
(2000) (analyzing the Webster formulation as supporting only action against an 
imminent threat). 
 
52. The failure of the U.S. intelligence community to assess accurately Iraq’s 
WMD capability is described in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf.  (analyzing pre-war intelligence 
regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and Iraq’s connection to 
terrorism).  For a discussion of how intelligence can be manipulated, see 
generally James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of 
America’s Intelligence Agencies (2004). 
 
53. The ICJ has stated: 
The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the 
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary 
international law.  As the Court stated in the case concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States): “There is a specific rule whereby self-
defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the 
armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established 
in customary international law.”  (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 
176).  This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the 
Charter, whatever the means of force employed.  
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 245 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion; see 
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Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 187-
88 (Nov. 6) (“The United States must also show that its actions were necessary 
and proportional to the armed attack made on it.”).  Discussions of necessity and 
proportionality also often refer to the Caroline incident since Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster analyzed those elements as cornerstones of the legal doctrine of 
self-defense.  See 29 British & Foreign State Papers 1129, 1138 (1937).  
 
54. See, e.g., Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 121 (noting that necessity and 
proportionality are both required aspects of actions taken in self-defense and that 
such action is necessary and proportionate only if it is taken to repel or stop 
attack, and not for punitive or retaliatory measures).  There is a link between the 
customary rules on necessity and proportionality between the jus ad bellum and 
the jus in bello.  See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship 
Between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 9 Rev. Int’l Stud. 221 (1983).  Thus, 
the Lieber Code’s definition of necessity states: “Military necessity, as 
understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those 
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and which are 
lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”  Francis Lieber, 
Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, in 
Dietrich Schindler & Jirí Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection 
of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents 3, at 6 (3d ed. 1988).  
 
55. See, e.g., Concerning Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 198-99 (“In this 
connection, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the United States 
complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, . . . which does not 
suggest that the targeting of the platforms was seen as a necessary act.”). 
 
56. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 
Am. J. Int’l L. 391, 391 (1993).  The author states:  
The resort to force . . . is limited by the customary law 
requirement that it be proportionate to the unlawful 
aggression that gave rise to the right. In the law of 
armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based 
on the fundamental principle that belligerents do not 
enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage 
on the enemy.   
Id.  Thus, in the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ decided that even if Iran had laid a 
mine that severely damaged a U.S. warship, responding to that mining with a 
military operation that destroyed two Iranian frigates and a number of other 
Iranian naval vessels and aircraft, could not be regarded as proportionate self-
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defense.  See Concerning Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 198-99 (“As a response to 
the mining, . . . of a single United States warship . . . neither “Operation Praying 
Mantis” as a whole, nor even that part of it that destroyed the [platforms], can be 
regarded, in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of force in 
self defence.”). 
 
57. For a further discussion of the beliefs and arguments of the imminent threat 
school, see supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text. 
 
58. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 19-20, Aug. 
2002, (ASIL Task Force on Terrorism), available at http: 
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. (pointing out that only by taking over 
another country wholly and eliminating its government can one country be sure 
that another will not attack). 
 
59. See Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum 
World Public Order 217 (1961) (examining requirements of self-defense: 
necessity and proportionality).  Abraham Sofaer argues that the Caroline 
standard of responding against a threat that is “‘instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means’” should be limited only to situations where “the state 
from which attacks are anticipated is not responsible for the threat, and is both 
able and willing to suppress them.”  Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-
emption, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 209, 219-220 (2003).  In all other situations, Sofaer 
believes that anticipatory or preemptive self-defense is simply governed by the 
principles of necessity and proportionality.  See id. at 320 (noting that “[T]he 
standard generally applicable to pre-emptive self-defence is, rather, the same 
general rule applicable to all uses of force: necessity . . . together with the 
requirement that any action be proportionate to the threat addressed.”). 
 
60. In 1962 President Kennedy stated: 
We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons 
represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute 
maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic 
missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of 
their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be 
regarded as a definite threat to peace.  
President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People 
on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, 485 Pub. Papers 806, 807 (Oct. 22, 1962). 
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61. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 59, at 220 (finding necessity to act and 
proportionality to be proper standard, with several factors determining necessity, 
including: nature and magnitude of threat, likelihood threat will be realized, 
availability and exhaustion of other alternatives and whether use of force is 
consistent with UN Charter and other international law); John Yoo, International 
Law and the War in Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 563, 572, 574 (2003) (examining 
Caroline test in light of weapons of mass destruction and finding that current test 
has become significantly more nuanced than Webster’s Caroline definition). 
 
62. Most international lawyers do not focus on the magnitude of harm to the 
victim, but in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 53, at 262-63, 
266, the ICJ accepted that fundamental rules of international law change “in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would 
be at stake.”  See id. at 262-63. 
 
63. See W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Law of War, 97 
Am. J. Int’l L. 82 passim (2003) (suggesting that such doctrine may contribute to 
world public order if subjected to appropriate criteria). 
 
64. For background on the invasion of Panama, see Jennifer Miller, International 
Intervention: The United States Invasion of Panama, 31 Harv. Int’l L.J. 633 
(1990). 
 
65. For background on the 1993 attack on Iraq, see Alan D. Surchin, Terror and 
the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, 5 
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 457 (1995). 
 
66. For background on the attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan, see Jules Lobel, 
The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and 
Afghanistan, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 537 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to 
Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 559 (1999).  
 
67. See, e.g., Kim R. Holmes, U.S. Dep’t of State Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization Affairs, The Future of U.S.-UN Relations, Remarks at 
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the XXI German American Conference (June 13, 2003), at 
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/21913/htm.  The speaker remarked: 
As contentious as the disagreement over Iraq was, it should not be 
over-emphasized. Neither the United States nor the U.K. ever 
asserted a right to operate outside their obligations under 
international law.  Neither took a position that called into question 
the existing international legal regime related to the use of force.  
Each country had lawyers examine relevant [U.N. Security Council] 
resolutions and clarify the legal basis for use of force before the 
decision to proceed was made. 
Id.  
 
68. Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-
Defense, Wkly. Standard, Jan. 28, 2002, 24, 27 [hereinafter Preempting 
Terrorism]; see also Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of 
Power: Interventionism After Kosovo (2001) [hereinafter Limits of Law] 
(examining humanities effort to subject use of force to rule of law and finding that 
it is no longer possible to know when use of force by state is legal under 
international law.  Currently states intervene on basis of less concrete concepts 
such as “justice”, or simply when it serves perceived interests of state); Michael 
J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 539, 540 (2002) 
(noting that use of force rules in United Nations Charter have been routinely 
disregarded and that use of force rules are basically illusory).  Professor Glennon 
is not alone, especially if one looks outside the realm of international lawyers to 
that of international relations theorists.  See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, 
International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 Stan. J. 
Int’l L. 1, 28 (1990).  One theorist stated: 
Based on what states have been saying and what 
they have been doing, there simply does not seem to 
be a legal prohibition on the use of force against the 
political independence and territorial integrity of states 
as provided in even a modified version of Article 2(4). 
The rule-creating process—-authoritative state 
practice—-has rejected that norm. 
Id.; see also Christine Chinkin, The State that Acts Alone: Bully, Good Samaritan 
or Iconoclast, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 31, (2000) (questioning indispensability of UN 
after Kosovo and finding UN’s role as icon of universal collective responsibility 
may no longer functionally exist); John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the 
Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 
Pace Int’l L. Rev. 283, 327 (2003) (finding that “Article 51's constraint on use of 
force has collapsed in actual practice.”).  
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69. See John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity 94 (1998) (explaining 
that narrative explanatory protocol comprises two “orders” of information: 
descriptive and configurative); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang 
Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructive Challenge, 52 Int’l Org. 
855-85 (1998) (discussing how modern theorizing in international relations views 
world in terms of actors and interests, ignoring “class of facts that do not exist in 
the physical object world . . . [facts that] depend on human agreement that they 
exist and typically require human institutions for their existence.  Social facts 
include money, property rights . . . [and] marriage . . . .”). 
 
70. For a further discussion of the key issues that arise in assessing 
methodology and state practice on this topic, see infra notes 72-191 and 
accompanying text. 
 
71. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 92-12, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT] (providing 
general rule of interpretation of treaties, including that treaties should be 
interpreted in good faith, context for interpretation of treaty and other 
considerations that should be taken into account).  The VCLT’s authoritative 
character as law, even for states not party to it, derives from the fact that it is now 
generally accepted that most of its provisions are declaratory of the customary 
international law of treaties.  See 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that Vienna 
Convention on law of treaties was registered “ex officio” on January 27, 1980).  
Although the United States has not become a party to the VCLT, it regards the 
substantive provisions of the VCLT as reflective of customary international law on 
the subject.  See S. Exec. Doc. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971) (“The 
convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current 
treaty law and practice.”); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States pt. III, introductory note (1987) (finding that Department of 
State has stated that it regards particular articles of Vienna Convention as 
codifying international law, and noting that United States courts have treated 
various provisions of Convention as authoritative). 
 
72. VCLT, supra note 71, art. 31(3)(b). 
 
73. See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 185 (2000).  
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74. For a further discussion of the beliefs and theories of the strict constructionist 
school, see supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text. 
 
75. See 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, supra note 18, 
at 493-98.  
 
76. See id. at 439.  
 
77. G.A. Res. 377(V), G.A.O.R., 5th Sess., 302nd Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/PV.302, 341 at 347 (Nov. 3, 1950). The resolution, entitled “Uniting for Peace” 
in essence purports to transfer from the Security Council to the General 
Assembly the authority to authorize the use of force under Chapter VII, in cases 
where the Security Council is deadlocked.  See id. 
 
78. For a further discussion of the beliefs and views held by the strict 
constructionist school, see supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text. 
 
79. Treaty interpretation calls for recourse to the preparatory work of the treaty 
(that is, the negotiating record) only where the initial interpretation leads to an 
ambiguous or obscure meaning or to an absurd or unreasonable result. See 
VCLT, supra note 56, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (presenting procedure for 
treaty interpretation). 
 
80. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-
Defense, 53 Am. J. Int’l. L. 597, 598-600 (1963) (referring to Caroline incident to 
show that necessity of self-defense does not require an actual armed attack); 
Bowett, supra note 38, at 187-190 (stating that Article 51 was intended to 
safeguard right of self-defence, and not restrict it and referring to Caroline as 
classical illustration of anticipatory self defense).  While McDougal does not use 
the term “inherent right”, he repeatedly refers to the understanding that acting in 
self-defense does not require an actual armed attack as the “customary right” of 
self-defense.  See id.; see also D.W. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of 
Intervention and Self-Defense, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 38, 
38-40 (John Norton Moore, ed. 1974) (arguing that Article 51 was intended to 
preserve “traditional right” of self defense, which included right to take action 
against threat before actual armed attack occurred).  For further discussion, see 
supra notes 37-58. 
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82. See Sofaer, supra note 59, at 213 (presenting some scholars’ belief that 
‘push button’ approach to analyzing Charter is flawed). 
 
83. See id. at 212) (stating that current standard is “necessity” and this should be 
determined in light of purposes of UN Charter). 
 
84. See id. at 213-14 (concluding that qualitative threat school believes that 
preemptive self-defense is only reasonable way to protect states from terrorism). 
 
85. 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, supra note 22, at 
803. 
 
86. For a discussion of the Charter is dead view that norms have no meaning, 
see supra note 68. 
 
87. See How Nations Behave, supra note 34, at 146 (recognizing that norm lies 
against use of force by states); Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of 
Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force 7-8 (2003) (“It is 
precisely because states show restraint that we live in a world of sovereign states 
at all.”). 
 
88. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2002: 
Uniform Crime Reports 19, 45 (2003) (presenting national crime statistics). 
 
89. See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 
53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113, 130-31 (1986) (arguing that violation of laws does not 
mean that legal restraints on conduct do not exist). 
 
90. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: 
International Relations and Customary International Law 6 (1999) (noting 
that use of quick, unorganized force to achieve goals has many disadvantages, 
however, organized use of force backed by legal system is more efficient and 
safer for states to employ). 
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91. See Limits of Law, supra note 68, at 42 (“There is simply no reason to 
assume that state conduct necessarily is caused by perceptions as to what a 
treaty permits or prohibits.  States act for reasons altogether unrelated to their 
treaty obligations.”). 
 
92. See generally Finnemore, supra note 88 (discussing various justifications for 
military intervention).  Professor Finnemore analyzes rules on the use of force 
from a sociological perspective, meaning a perspective that explains the conduct 
of actors by reference to the social structures in which they are embedded.  See 
id. (analyzing need and reasons for intervention based on surrounding social and 
political circumstances).  Among other things, she finds that legal norms have 
played a key role in fundamentally changing state practice regarding the use of 
force.  See id. (noting that legal norms play important role in nations’ 
determinations regarding intervention). 
 
93. For example, in the course of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair apparently saw considerable importance in obtaining 
Security Council authorization, to the point that his government was considered 
at risk of falling in March 2003 when it became clear that express Security 
Council authorization was not forthcoming.  See, e.g., Karen DeYoung & Colum 
Lynch, Britain Races To Rework Resolution, Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 2003, at A1 
(reporting that Blair supported amending resolution even in face of challenge to 
power); Glenn Frankel, Parliament Backs Blair on Action Against Baghdad, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 2003, at A17 (reporting on revolt, that ultimately was 
defeated, in Blair’s Labor Party). 
 
94. Jus cogens refers to a fundamental or peremptory norm of international law 
from which states cannot deviate.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-01, (June 27) (finding that 
rule against use of force is “conspicuous example of a rule of international law 
having the character of jus cogens”); see also VCLT, supra note 56, art. 53, 1155 
U.N.T.S., at 344 (stating that norm of jus cogens “is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted . . . .”). 
 
95. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
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States § 102 cmt. k (1987) (stating that provisions of U.N. Charter prohibiting use 
of force have character of jus cogens as recognized by international community).  
 
96. See Limits of Law, supra note 54, at 40-42 (asking why majority of states 
cannot simply act to change rule that was previously accepted by international 
community). 
 
97. For a discussion of the interest in state practice, see supra notes 33-35, 48, 
64-66, 69, and accompanying text. 
 
98. For a discussion of the problem of examining what states say versus 
examining what states do, see infra notes 101-123 and accompanying text.  For 
a discussion of the issues surrounding identifying what states actually do, see 
infra notes 124-142 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on how to 
incorporate the global reaction to a states use of force, see infra notes 143-149 
and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the problems of the relative 
infrequency of state actions and possible solutions, see infra notes 150-177 and 
accompanying text.  For a discussion on the importance of recent versus 
historical state practice, particularly in light of the events of September 11th, see 
infra note 178 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the problems 
associated with resorting to the Travaux (preparatory work) of the Charter, see 
infra notes 179-191 and accompanying text.  
 
99. See Recourse to Force, supra note 49, at 102-03. 
 
100. See, e.g., Cassese, International Law, supra note 34, at 308-310 
(discussing rationale and conflicting views on anticipatory defense). 
 
101. Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 130; see also Brunnée & Toope, supra note 
32, at 790-91 (“For the purposes of assessing the fit of an action within a 
normative framework, however, one must focus upon justifications actually 
offered rather than suspected motivations.”). 
 
102. See Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 130-31 (stating that “the point of 
importance is that Israel did not rely on anticipatory self-defence to justify its 
actions”). 
 
103. States have not always submitted a report to the Security Council when they 
have used force against other states.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
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and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 121 (June 27).  The 
United States’ failure to report to the Security Council in this manner during the 
actions at issue in the Nicaragua case, however, led the ICJ to observe “that this 
conduct of the United States hardly conforms with the latter’s avowed conviction 
that it was acting in the context of collective self-defence as consecrated by 
Article 51 of the Charter,” and thus contributed to the ICJ’s finding that the United 
States was not acting in self-defense.  See id.  Consequently, since that time the 
United States typically has submitted such reports to the Security Council when 
undertaking a use of force.  See Gray 2d ed., supra note 35 at 102-103 
(discussing how after Nicaragua case states regularly report actions to Security 
Counsel, and in fact now tend to over-report claims and noting that United States 
chose to report and thus justify each episode of use of force against Iran during 
period of conflict between Iraq and Iran). 
 
104. For trenchant criticisms in this regard, see Glennon, Limits of Law, supra 
note 69, at 44-46, 56-58, 76-78, & 80. 
 
105. See Recourse to Force, supra note 49, at 102-03 (finding that Security 
Counsel gave credence to argument to anticipatory self-defense by not censuring 
Israeli action in any of its resolutions on issue); see Cassese, International Law, 
supra note 34, at 308 (“Israel has resorted to anticipatory self-defence on various 
occasions: for example in 1967 against Egypt . . . .”). 
 
106. See, e.g., Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the “Jurisprudes,” 97 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 585, 587-88 (2003) (discussing idea that because United Stated did not 
justify Cuban quarantine on grounds of preemptive self-defense, it cannot be 
used as precedent); see also Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: 
International Crises and the Role of Law 62-66 (1974) (stating that preemptive 
self-defense argument was continually rejected as justification for quarantine). 
 
107. See, e.g., Recourse to Force, supra note 49, at 99-101 (looking past 
Unites States’s stated reasons to its actions).  
 
108. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 61, at 573 (positing that United States’ 
justification for Cuban quarantine was not credible and that preemptive self-
defense was true ground for action). 
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109. See generally Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence 
for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy (1992) (discussing 
how states use stated rules to set forth their own policy).  The New Haven school 
would see the function of rules on the use of force as “not mechanically to dictate 
specific decision but to guide the attention of decision-makers to significant 
variable factors in typical recurring contexts of decision, to serve as summary 
indices to relevant crystallized community expectations, and, hence, to permit 
creative and adaptive, instead of arbitrary and irrational, decisions.”  McDougal & 
Feliciano, supra note 59, at 57. 
 
110. For a discussion of the issues surrounding identifying what states actually 
do, see infra notes 124-142 and accompanying text.  
 
111. See O’Connell, supra note 44, at 3 (concluding that, because of national 
values and need for national security, United States has taken strong position 
against preemptive self-defense). 
 
112. See Preempting Terrorism, supra note 54, at 25 (noting that in 1986, United 
States claimed right to use preemptive self-defense against Lybia following 
terrorist attack in Berlin). 
 
113. See generally John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and The 
American Experience (2004) (arguing that with end of U.S.-French alliance in 
1800, fledgling United States had to defend itself against real threats and did so 
by acting unilaterally and preemptively). 
 
114. See Gray 2d ed., supra note 35 at 177 (noting that opposition by many 
states to Operation Iraqi Freedom makes it clear that many states were not 
willing to accept pre-emptive self-defense as legal basis for operation). 
 
115. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. 
Doc. 342, 343 (Mar 19, 2003). 
 
116. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service, U.S. Use of Preemptive 
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Military Force, CRS Report RS21311 (updated Apr. 11, 2003) (“The President 
did not explicitly characterize his military action as an implementation of the 
expansive concept of preemptive use of military force against rogue states with 
WMD contained in his National Security Strategy document of September 
2002.”).  
 
117. See Letter Dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (2003) (“The actions being taken are 
authorized under existing Council resolutions.”); see also George W. Bush, 
Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 338, 339 (Mar. 17, 
2003) (“Under Resolutions 678 and 687, both still in effect, the United States and 
our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction.  This is not a question of authority.  It is a question of will.”); U.N. 
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 (Resumption 1) 
(2003) (statement of U.S. Permanent Representative to United Nations to 
Security Council) (“Resolution 687 (1991) imposed a series of obligations on Iraq 
that were the conditions of the ceasefire.  It has long been recognized and 
understood that a material breach of those obligations removes the basis of the 
ceasefire and revives the authority to use force under resolution 678 (1990).”); 
William H. Taft, IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 
97 Am. J. Int’l L. 557, 563 (2003) (containing essay by State Department Legal 
Adviser and his assistant basing legality of invasion on Security Council 
resolutions, but also stating that “a principal objective” of coalition forces in 
context of those resolutions was to preempt Iraq’s possession and use of WMD); 
Holmes, supra note 68 (“The decision to go to war with Iraq was based on 
international law: Existing Security Council resolutions against Iraq provided a 
sufficient legal basis for military action.”); William H. Taft, IV, U.S. Dep’t of State 
Legal Adviser, Remarks Before the National Association of Attorneys General 
15-16 (Mar. 20, 2003), at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/text2003/032129taft.htm. (“Under 
international law, the basis for use of force is equally strong.  There is clear 
authorization from the Security Council to use force to disarm Iraq.”).  For my 
analysis of this legal theory, finding it plausible but ultimately unpersuasive, see 
Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 Geo. L.J. 173 
(2004). 
 
118. For the Australia letter to the Security Council, see Letter Dated 20 March 
2003 From the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. S/2003/352 (2003).  For the U.K. letter to the Security Council, see Letter 
Dated 20 March 2003 From the Permanent Representative of the United 
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Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
S/2003/350 (2003).  For the legal analysis of the U.K. Attorney-General, see 
Current Development: Public International Law, 52 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 811, 811-
12 (statement by U.K. Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith in answer to 
parliamentary question in House of Lords).  Although Spain did not contribute 
troops to the invasion, it supported, as a Security Council Member, the legal 
theory advanced by the United States and its allies.  See U.N. SCOR, 58th 
Sess., 4721st mtg. at 15-16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4721 (2003)  (explaining its support 
for United States with regard to “alleviat[ing] the suffering of the Iraqi people.”).  
For Poland, which was not a Member of the Security Council, but did contribute 
forces, see U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg. at 24-25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 
(2003) (expressing its alignment with European Union because of desire to 
remove Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, “which threaten international peace 
and security”). 
 
119. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 117, at 339 (“The United States of America has 
the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security.”); see 
also Letter Dated 20 March 2003 From the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, supra note 117, at 2 (“The actions that coalition forces are 
undertaking . . . are necessary steps to defend the United States . . . from the 
threat posed by Iraq . . . .”); see also Taft, supra note 117 (“The President may 
also, of course, always use force under international law in self-defense.”). 
 
120. See, e.g., Brunnée & Toope, supra note 41, at 794 (noting some 
commentators’ arguments that “an intervention in Iraq could not be justified as 
self-defence”). 
 
121. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 
24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 513, 547-48 (2002-03) (finding that “the controversy centers 
on whether the situation was ripe for a U.S. military preemptive operation, not the 
legality of such an operation in the abstract”). 
 
122. Standard theories of customary international law call for an analysis of both 
state conduct and opinio juris, which is a belief by the state’s decision-makers 
that the conduct is lawful.  See G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of 
International Law 85-113 (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers 1983) (discussing 
custom as it pertains to international law); see also Mark E. Villiger, Customary 
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International Law and Treaties 11-63 (Kluwer Law International 1997)  
(explaining how to analyze state actions and how to determine rationale behind 
these actions).  As noted above, however, it often is not clear whether 
international lawyers are engaging in an analysis of emergent customary 
international law, as opposed to an interpretation of a treaty based on 
subsequent state practice.  See id. at 29-37 (differentiating between customary 
interpretations of international rules and digressions from them).  
 
123. Some observers think that the driving motivation of influential persons in the 
Bush Administration was not to deal with an urgent and imminent danger to the 
United States but, rather, to establish a democracy in Iraq that would help in 
democratizing the whole Islamic world.  See Stefan Halper & Jonathan Clarke, 
America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order 218-19 (2004) 
(suggesting that if Bush Administration could democratize Iraq, other Middle 
Eastern powers would follow Iraq’s lead); see also James Mann, Rise of the 
Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet 346 (Viking 2004) (“Some of the 
Vulcans hoped that in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, the United States could 
turn Iraq into a model for democracy that would transform Arab political culture 
and the politics of the entire Middle East . . . .”). 
 
124. See Limits of Law, supra note 69, at 46 (“International lawyers pine for 
better ways to get ‘into the heads’ of state decision makers . . . . [but] many of 
those decision makers, if at all candid, would reply ‘Who cares?’ or ‘There’s no 
such thing.’”). 
 
125. See, e.g., Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 121 (“States have invoked 
collective self-defence as a justification for inviting in foreign troops before any 
armed attack has occurred, in case collective self-defence is needed in the 
future; that is, as a deterrent or as a precaution.”); see also 1 The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary, supra note 22, at 805 (“Consequently, lawful 
self-defence is restricted to the repulse of an armed attack and must not entail 
retaliatory or punitive actions.”). 
 
126. Recent state practice on this may be seen in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict of 
1990-91 (although in that instance, claims of self-defense were mixed with 
Chapter VII authority) and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict of 1998-2001. 
 
127. See Dinstein, supra note 30, at 194-203 (“To be defensive, and therefore 
lawful, armed reprisals must be future oriented, and not limited to a desire to 
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punish past transgressions.”). 
 
128. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1620, 1638 (1984) (“Thus, ‘defensive retaliation’ may be justified when a 
state has good reason to expect a series of attacks from the same source and 
such retaliation serves as a deterrent or protective action.”). 
 
129. See Bothe, supra note 51, at 235 (explaining that “legality of anticipatory 
self-defence” is not pertinent to analyses of armed attacks). 
 
130. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 119 (June 27) (considering whether United States acted in 
self-defense with regard to its military activities in Nicaragua).  
 
131. See Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 
161, 195 (Nov. 6) (“The Court does not exclude the possibility that the mining of 
a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the ‘inherent right of 
self-defence’ . . . .”). 
 
132. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 Harv. J. Int’l L. 41, 47, 50-51 (2002) (arguing that 
September 11th attack on United States was “armed attack” by comparing it to 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and explaining that United States had authority, 
under Article 51, to respond in self-defense). 
 
133. See id. (discussing support for theory that United States had been attacked 
in September 2001, thus justifying its response in self-defense). 
 
134. See Preempting Terrorism, supra note 69, at 26 (discussing argument that 
United States’ military action in Afghanistan in 2001 was not prompted by armed 
attack and was, instead, preemptive strike). 
 
135. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World 
War II 329, 331 (Cambridge University Press 1994) (discussing growth of United 
States’ forces as it prepared to attack Japan and other related history).   
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136. See Dinstein, supra note 30, at 201 (noting bombing in Berlin that killed two 
American servicemen); see also 1986: US Launches Air Strikes on Libya, (Apr. 
15, 1986), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/397545
5.stm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) (discussing alleged details of Berlin night club 
bombing, as noted by President Reagan).  
 
137. See Dinstein, supra note 30, at 201 (discussing United States’ 1986 attacks 
on Libya in response to Libyan attacks, including Berlin bombing). 
 
138. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 29, at 154-56 (explaining differing views on 
definition of self defense, as some lawyers argue that traditional self-defense is 
“in response to armed attack” and is restricted to necessity and proportionality, 
whereas others do not require acts in self-defense to be in response to armed 
attacks, arguing that they can “be invoked also to defend other vital interests”); 
see also, e.g., Yoo, supra note 61, at 573 (“In the past two decades, the United 
States has used military force in anticipatory self-defense against Libya, 
Panama, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Sudan.”). 
 
139. See Sean D. Murphy, United States Practice in International Law, Vol. I: 
1999-2001 392-94 (2002) (citing President Clinton’s address on March 24, 1999, 
in which he justified NATO’s attacks on FRY, Serbia and Montenegro as “act to 
protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military 
offensive” and “to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of 
Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results”).  
 
140. See Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 
93 Am. J. Int’l L. 834 (1999) (noting that Kosovo intervention occurred after 
United Nations “was unable to act effectively in Rwanda and Bosnia”). 
 
141. See, e.g., Gray 2d ed., supra note 35, at 129-33, 181-84 (expressing view 
that self-defensive actions are unlawful). 
 
142. See Limits of Law, supra note 69, at 58, 79-80 (indicating that international 
lawyers analyze actions of individual states to determine “international reaction” 
of all states, collectively). 
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143.  See id. at 49-51, 58 (suggesting that international law provides limited 
guidance and that international lawyers, “[f]aced more often than not with a 
dearth of data . . . continue to infer community intent from a handful of its 
members . . . .”).  
 
144. See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a 
State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 9 (Mar. 3) (looking to practice of 
Security Council and General Assembly when interpreting U.N. Charter 
provisions on admission of states to United Nations); see also 1983 U.N. Jurid. 
Y.B. 179, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/21 (highlighting UN Security Council practice 
for purpose of interpreting Rules 13 and 15 of UN Security Council provisional 
rules of procedure); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 22 (June 21) (using such practice to 
interpret voting requirements of UN Charter article 27(3)). 
 
145. For an argument that the international legal order is built upon 
accommodations to the “Great Powers,” see Gerry Simpson, Great Powers 
and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order 52 
(2004) (explaining that “legislative equality is affected by distinctions existing 
between different classes of state on the basis of their influence of power” and 
noting that “[t]he Great Powers possess constitutional privileges within 
international organizations or dominate the law-making process at international 
conferences”).  Professor Finnemore writes: “Decision makers in strong states 
with the capacity for extensive military intervention have a much greater impact 
on changes in these rules than other people do, and, through the several 
centuries examined here, those states are overwhelmingly Western ones that 
become increasingly liberal, democratic, and capitalistic over time.”  Finnemore, 
supra note 88, at 18. 
 
146. Michael Byers raises this possibility without himself adopting whether such a 
methodology is appropriate.  See Michael Byers, Book Review, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 
721, 722-23 (2003) (“One could argue that the practice of the Council is the 
delegated practice of all the members of the United Nations . . . .”). 
 
147. See id. at 723 (emphasizing significant influence of Security Council’s 
permanent members); but see Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International 
Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today, 
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67 L. & Contemp. Prob. 147 (2004) (arguing in favor of maintaining the principle 
of sovereign equality). 
 
148. See Dinstein, supra note 30 at 167 (suggesting that self-defense in 
response to armed attacks is more favored than preemptive self-defense). 
 
149. See International Incidents: The Law that Counts in World Politics 23 
(W. Michael Reisman et al., eds. 1988) (“Incidents may serve as a type of ‘meta-
law,’ providing normative guidelines for decision makers in the international 
system in those vast deserts in which case law is sparse.”).  
 
150. See id. (“A genre whose practitioners continue to update and correct the 
expression of the code of international law is required.  If it is established . . . it 
can ultimately yield an abundant literature of international appraisal . . . more 
accurate in expressing international normative expectations.”).  
 
151. See Aust, supra note 74, at 194 (citing to U.S.-France Air Services 
Arbitration, 54 I.L.R. 303 (1963)). 
 
152. The basic rule emphasizing constancy and repetition was articulated by the 
ICJ in Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 267-77 (Nov. 20). 
 
153. Pursuit of this analysis would need to confront the divergences of views 
over what constitutes practice for purposes of customary international law, as 
exemplified in the debate between Michael Akehurst and Anthony D’Amato. See 
Anthony A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law 80-81 
(Cornell University Press 1971) (explaining that “international law is all-pervasive” 
and indicating that definition of customary practices, under international law, is 
broad). 
 
154. See Bill Clinton, My Life 602-03 (2004) (stating that Clinton Administration 
considered taking military action against North Korea until North Korea changed 
its policy and agreed to start talks with United States in Geneva). 
 
155. See BBC News World Ed., Japan Threatens Force Against N. Korea, (Feb. 
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14, 2003), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2757923.stm (describing 
Japan’s warning to conduct preemptive military action against North Korea, in 
response to Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities).  
 
156. See generally Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened 
for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty] (calling upon states to work toward nuclear 
disarmament and to share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but 
preserving right of five states to possess nuclear weapons: China, France, 
Russia, United Kingdom and United States).  Certain states with nuclear 
weapons capability--India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan--either have not 
joined or have withdrawn from this treaty.  See id. (excluding India, Israel, North 
Korea and Pakistan from Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). 
 
157. See generally Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 
U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention] (forbidding parties 
from “develop[ing], produc[ing], otherwise acquir[ing], stockpil[ing] or retain[ing] 
chemical weapons, or tranfer[ing], directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to 
anyone” and requiring all parties to destroy their chemical weapons within ten 
years after convention’s entry into force, which occurred in 1997). 
 
158.  See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 
163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention] (banning development, 
production, stockpiling or acquisition of biological agents or toxins “of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other 
peaceful purposes”).  
 
159. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done 
June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol] 
(banning use in war of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,” and 
“bacteriological methods of warfare”).  
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160. See Brownlie, supra note 21, at 276 (citing First Report of the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission which states violation of treaty may be so 
grave so as to rise to right of self-defense under Article 51); Jessup, supra note 
28, at 167 (quoting from First Report of Atomic Energy Commission); see also 
Quincy Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. Int’l L. 514, 529 (1956) 
(citing to similar IAEA report in 1950s).  
 
161. See Jessup, supra note 28, at 166-67 (discussing United States’ view on 
controlling atomic warfare).  
 
162. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(Hijacking), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 
105 (providing appropriate measures among contracting States for punishing 
persons who unlawfully intimidate, seize or exercise control of aircraft while on 
board). 
 
163. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation (Sabotage), opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 
974 U.N.T.S. 177 (providing penalties among contracting States for persons who 
commit sabotage on board aircraft). 
 
164. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 
17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (providing for punishment of 
individuals who commit acts of hostage taking). 
 
165. See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, done Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (providing 
measures of dealing with person committing violent acts on board aircraft). 
 
166. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (providing for State parties to 
Convention to make crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally 
protected persons punishable according to their grave nature). 
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167. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1997) 
(providing that parties to Convention assign appropriate penalties for terrorist 
offenses). 
 
168. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 
(1999) (discussing measures for punishing individuals involved in financing 
terrorism). 
 
169. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 
(1997) (mandating that attempt to commit terrorist acts violates resolution as if 
terrorist act had been successful).  
 
170. S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1377 (2001); see also, e.g., S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 
5053rd mtg. at para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (2004) (referring to terrorism as 
serious threat to peace and security); S.C. Res. 1070, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 
3690th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1070 (1996) (stating suppressing 
international terrorism is necessary to maintain international peace and security); 
S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 
(1992) (referring to acts of international terrorism that threaten international 
peace and security). 
 
171. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (2001). 
 
172. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1368 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 
173. See Finnemore, supra note 88, at 73-84 (discussing humanitarian 
intervention and its changing over time). 
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174. See, e.g., Joint Resolution Authorizing Force Against Iraq, supra note 9, at 
1500 (stating that President has Constitutional authority to prevent and deter acts 
of terrorism). 
 
176. See, e.g., Cassese, International Law, supra note 34, at 309-10 (stating 
that all members of Security Council except Israel disagreed with Israeli 
justification for attack on Iraqi nuclear reactor). 
 
177. See VCLT, supra note 72, at art. 31 (discussing supplementary means of 
interpretation, including preparatory work, in treaty interpretation). 
 
178. For a discussion of the disagreement between different schools of thought 
relating to preemptive self-defense, see supra notes 72-100 and accompanying 
text. 
 
179. For a discussion of the use of the negotiating history of the Charter, see 
supra note 21 and accompanying text.  For an example of how a particular 
school, the strict constructionists, uses the negotiating history of the charter to 
further its cause, see supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 
180. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 21, at 275-76 (discussing how travaux 
préparatoires suggests presumption against self-defense in Article 51). 
 
181. See, e.g., Brierly, supra note 43, at 417-18 (mentioning travaux 
préparatoires suggests Article 51 supports recourse to self-defense). 
 
182. See generally, e.g., Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preventive and 
Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search for Original Intent, 3 
Wyoming L. Rev. 663 (2003) (discussing drafting history of Charter to determine 
whether drafters intended to permit state to use preventive or preemptive force in 
self defense). 
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183. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 185 
(July 20) (separate opinion of Judge Spender) (stating terms of Charter itself in 
context should be looked at for interpreting text rather than travaux 
préparatoires). 
 
184. See Recourse to Force, supra note 49, at 50 (recounting exchanges 
between Harold Stassen and members of U.S. delegation, including State 
Department Legal Adviser Green Hackworth, in which Stassen made clear that 
actual armed attack must occur before resort to self-defense); Kearley, supra 
note 184, at 669 (concluding that drafters did not intend to preclude self-defense 
against imminent attack, but intended to preclude self-defense against attack 
believed to be inevitable, but not imminent). 
 
185. See Kearley, supra note 184, at 680-81 (stating that right to self-defense 
that exists in Article 51 is due to Latin American nations’ demands for collective 
security arrangements).   
 
186. See id. at 701-03 (noting Eden’s support of French proposal, rather than 
U.S. proposal, that triggers right to self defense only when there is “armed 
attack”). 
 
187. See id. at 702 (discussing Eden’s fear of possible attack by using 
hypothetical example of “Soviet instigated attack by Bulgaria on Turkey,” which 
would lead Great Britain to want to preemptively attack enemy to protect itself).    
 
188. See id. at 702-714 (providing extensive discussion of negotiating language 
of Article 51, ending with final agreement including phrase “armed attack” 
proposed by United States). 
 
189. For a summary of this encounter, see Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of 
Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (2003). Stettinius was likely 
referring to Germany’s attack on Poland in 1939 and on Norway in 1940, both of 
which were asserted by German officials to be anticipatory self-defense and both 
of which were found to be aggression by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg.  See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgement and 
Sentences, 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 205 (1947) (stating Germany attacked Norway 
to prevent Allied invasion).  He may also have had in mind Japan’s attack on 
Manchuria in 1931, which Japan asserted was a necessary act of self-defense. 
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190. Finnemore, supra note 88, at 1. 
 
191. See id. at 19 (“Waging wars for the glory of one’s country is no longer 
honored or even respectable in contemporary politics.  Force is viewed as 
legitimate only as a last resort, and only for defensive or humanitarian 
purposes.”). 
 
192. For a discussion on the different views of the various schools on preemptive 
self-defense, see supra notes 17-69 and accompanying text. 
 
193. For a discussion of the debate between four different schools of thought, 
see supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text. 
 
194. For a discussion of the lack of methodological approach to determining 
legality of preemptive self-defense, see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying 
text. 
 
195. For a discussion of the problem of lawyers failing to explain the legal 
theories they are using with respect to preemptive self-defense, see supra notes 
150-177 and accompanying text. 
 
196. For a discussion of the problems created by international lawyers not 
explaining why one method of analysis is superior to another, see supra notes 
70-71 and accompanying text.  
 
197. For a discussion of distinct problems of law surrounding preemptive self-
defense, see supra notes 72-190 and accompanying text. 
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